

LUKE IAN MINER

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DATE OF BIRTH: 25 Mar 1978

SEX: M

CITIZENSHIP: USA and UK

PREDOCTORAL STUDIES:

M.Sc. in Economics	London School of Economics	2005-2007
D.E.A. (Masters) in Philosophy of Science	EHESS, Paris	2004-2005
B.A. in Modern Thought and Literature	Stanford University	1996-2000

GRADUATE STUDIES:

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS

DATES: September 2007 – present

THESIS TITLE: “Essays on the Role of the Internet and Social Learning in Economic Development and Political Change”

EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: June 2012

THESIS ADVISOR AND REFERENCES:

Prof. Robin Burgess (advisor)
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Dr. Valentino Larcinese
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DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Development Economics, Political Economy

Secondary Fields: Applied Econometrics, Experimental Economics, Public Policy

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

Microeconomics Principles I (2nd Year Undergraduate Course, LSE): 2009-10
Teaching Assistant to Margaret Bray and Erik Eyster

Assessing the Effects of Mergers using PCAIDS and ALM models in Mathematica (The Office of Fair Trade, London): Instructor Summer 2007

LANGUAGES

English (native), French (fluent), Japanese (intermediate), Spanish (basic)

RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE:

The Office of Fair Trade, London, Summer Intern Summer 2007
Programmed models for simulating the price effects of different mergers in Mathematica and trained staff in their use. Created variation of the ALM model, which takes account of mergers where collusion results in price increases.

The New York Review of Books, Editorial Assistant 8/2001-12/2002
Edited submissions on topics such as philosophy, economics, politics, and physics. Read and authored reports on unsolicited manuscripts. Helped choose books for review and suggest contributors.

OTHER EXPERIENCE:

Department of Economics, University of Tokyo, Visiting Scholar 2010

Research Assistant to Professor Georg Weizsäcker 2008

Research Assistant to Professor Danny Quah 2006

COMPLETED PAPERS:

Job Market Paper:

"The Unintended Consequences of Internet Diffusion: Evidence from Malaysia", 2011

Can the internet promote democratization by weakening government control of the media? To examine this question, I develop a model where internet penetration decreases incumbent party vote share by greatly increasing the cost of buying off the media. I test the model against evidence from Malaysia, where the incumbent coalition lost its 40 year monopoly on power in 2008. I use data matching IP addresses with physical locations to construct a measure of internet growth in Malaysia from 2004 to 2008. Using an instrumental variable approach, I find that areas with higher internet penetration experience higher turnout, higher turnover and tighter races, with the Internet accounting for a third of the 10% swing against the incumbent party in 2008. In fact, the results suggest that in the absence of the internet, the opposition would not have achieved its historic upset in the 2008 elections.

Other Papers:

"To Whom Do We Pay Attention when Following the Crowd?", 2008

When observing the behavior of players in a sequence, from whom do we learn the most? To answer this question I draw on a meta-dataset of 13 laboratory experiments on social learning. I find that people behave contrary to the predictions of the prevailing models used to understand social learning and information cascades. Under Bayes Nash Equilibrium and QRE based models of information cascades, the most informative signals come from the first player in the sequence or from a player who has broken a cascade. However, I find that agents learn most not from the first player but from the decision directly preceding their own. Furthermore, I find no evidence of learning from cascade breaks.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:

"The Internet's Impact on Voter Mobilization: Evidence from the United States" with Valentino Larcinese (LSE)

The internet is said to have played a key role in the 2008 US presidential campaign both as a source of campaign funds and as a medium for connecting with younger voters. We plan to use a difference-in-difference strategy to estimate these effects, focusing on the following dimensions: demographic changes in voting patterns; engagement and voter turnout; and campaign donations. This project will contribute to the literature by (a) using an exogenous variation in internet supply (b) providing new evidence of the effect of the internet on elections in the context of a democratic, industrialized nation.