

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

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DATE OF BIRTH: 30/01/1980

SEX: F

CITIZENSHIP: Polish/Bulgarian

CURRENT POSITION:

2008-present: Postdoctoral research fellow at the London School of Economics, Managerial Economics and Strategy Group

GRADUATE STUDIES:

2003 – December 2007: PhD in Economics, University of Montpellier 1 and CREST with highest honors

Thesis Title: “Essays in Organization Theory: Incentives and Organizations' Structure”

Committee: Bernard Caillaud, Wouter Dessein, Robert Gary-Bobo, Bernard Salanie, Wilfried Sand-Zantman (advisor), Marc Willinger

2002-2003: Master in Economics University Montpellier 1 (with distinction)

UNDERGRADUATE STUDIES:

1998 – 2002: B.A. in Economics (with distinction), University Montpellier I.

REFERENCES:

Professor Luis Garicano
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Professor Bernard Salanie
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Professor Wilfried Sand Zantman
Toulouse School of Economics
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DESIRED TEACHING AND RESEARCH:

Primary Fields: Organizational economics, Contract Theory

Secondary Fields: Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics

TEACHING EXPERIENCE:

London School of Economics

- MG220 Organizational Strategy (LSE Summer School, lectures): summer 2009
- MG411 Firms and Markets (graduate, classes): Fall 2008,2009; Winter 2009, 2010
- MG413 Entrepreneurial Strategy (graduate, classes): Winter 2009, 2010

University of Cergy-Pontoise

- Microeconomics (undergraduate, classes): Fall 2006, 2007
- Statistics (undergraduate, classes): Fall 2007

Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussees

- Competition and markets (graduate, classes): Spring 2006

Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de l'Administration Economique

- Microeconomics (undergraduate, classes): Spring 2004, 2005; Fall 2005

POSITIONS AND FELLOWSHIPS:

From 09/2006 Research and teaching assistant (ATER) at the University of Cergy-Pontoise to 08/2008

From 09/2006 Doctoral fellow at CREST to 08/2008

From 09/2003 Doctoral grant and fellowship at CREST (Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique) to 08/2006

LANGUAGES

Fluent Spoken

English, French, Bulgarian, Polish

Basic Spoken

Italian, Russian

Fluent Written

English, French, Bulgarian

Basic Written

Polish

JOB MARKET PAPER:

“Motivate and Select: Markets and the Form of Compensation”, working paper

This paper analyzes how an employer motivates employees who are privately informed about their ability and whose performance is non-contractible. The employer can credibly offer a bonus only for tasks that, if successfully completed, signal that the employee's ability is high enough relatively to the average unemployed. To induce agents to exert effort on easy tasks, the employer therefore resorts to a termination contract, consisting of a fixed wage and a performance standard the agent must reach to stay in the firm. In equilibrium, employees exert effort on difficult tasks to receive the bonus and on easy ones to keep their jobs. In the labor market equilibrium there is an endogenous gap in the productivity of the employees and the unemployed. As this gap increases, the bonus is offered for a larger range of tasks. Exogenous labor market conditions as well as the organizational structure of the firms affect the productivity gap and hence the reward scheme. I show that the bonus is used more extensively in sectors with low exogenous rate of job destruction, and to motivate managers of larger teams.

PUBLICATIONS:

“Supply of Skilled Labour and Organizational Change”, forthcoming in *Labour Economics*

The paper develops a model where the structure of organizations is a choice variable for firms and depends on conditions in the labour market. It shows that an increase in the supply of skilled labour may lead firms to adopt organizations with less hierarchical levels. This organizational change increases firms' demand for skilled agents and qualitatively modifies their jobs (i.e. the set of tasks assigned to skilled employees) thus increasing the skilled wage premium.

“Mutual Monitoring versus Incentive Pay in Teams”, forthcoming in *Annales d'Economie et de Statistique*

Agents who work in teams may be better informed about each other's effort than the employer. We analyse how the possibility for employees to write contracts on this information alters the incentives provided by the principal. We show that side-contracting is profitable for the employer when agents are well informed and hardly constrained by a limited liability.

WORKING PAPERS:

“Incentives, Markets and Knowledge based Hierarchies”, working paper 2008

This paper studies how the labor market shapes the firms' organizational form. Aiming to use employees' knowledge efficiently, firm owners design their organizations by optimally allocating tasks between workers and managers in the firm. The allocation of tasks and the choice of the number of workers and managers to be hired depends on the wage structure and the expected ability of each population of employees. Labor market conditions - supply and demand, but also institutional constraints – determine agents' outside opportunities and the characteristics of their ability distributions. Consequently, the labor market conditions dictate the optimal organizational design, in terms of firms' size, task allocation, and span of control. Conversely, the way firms adapt to evolutions in the market conditions affects, in turn, the equilibrium structure of employment and wages. We show, for example, that an increase in the minimum wage increases the workers to managers ratio and adversely affects the skilled agents both in terms of employment and wages.

“Spinoffs”, working paper 2009

In this paper I develop a theory of inefficient spinoffs. Employees privately observe the value of their ideas and decide to implement them either within the parent firm, which is source of synergies, or in spinoffs. Thus, employees with good ideas have a higher outside option, and the firm can retain the agents with the best ideas only at the cost of increased wage for all employees. As a result, if there is a small fraction of bright ideas, they are implemented in spinoffs. In this context, I characterize the distribution of managerial ability - the commonly known ability of an employee to successfully develop an idea - of the entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs, and analyze the interdependence between the firm's core activity and the quality of its spinoffs. I find, first, that the agents with lowest managerial ability always become intrapreneurs. Second, in capital intensive industries, firms with higher performance in their core activity spawn less but better - i.e. with higher survival rate - spinoffs.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS:

“Managerial Incentives and Product Market Reputation”, joint with Jeanine Miklos-Thal

REFEREE SERVICES:

Journal of Industrial Economics, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Mathematical Social Sciences, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

SEMINAR PRESENTATIONS:

- 2009 Oxford Labour and Applied Microeconometrics Seminar, LSE – Managerial Economics and Strategy Group
- 2008 London School of Economics, Paris School of Economics, University of Mannheim, University Paris – Dauphine, University Paris X, University Cergy-Pontoise
- 2007 CREST
- 2006 Paris School of Economics, University Cergy-Pontoise, CREST, University Montpellier 1
- 2005 University Paris 1, CREST

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS:

- 2008 ADRES Doctoral days in Toulouse
- 2007 Association of Southern European Economic Theorists (ASSET) in Padova, Annual congress of the French Economic Association (AFSE), Econometric Society European Meeting (ESEM) in Budapest
- 2005 European Economic Association (EEA) in Amsterdam, Journées de Microéconomie Appliquée (JMA) in Hammamet