Outline

From Utility Maximization to Market Efficiency
  Quick Review: Consumer Choice
  Quick Review: Market Equilibrium
  Application: TANF and Labor Supply
  Application: TANF and Efficiency

Fundamental Theorems of WE

Conclusion
Imagine: Life after Stanford

- You graduate from Stanford and land a sweet job at the California Health and Human Services Agency (HHS), which oversees Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
- The current governor is considering reducing TANF benefits, in order to induce work among recipients.
- The secretary of HHS disagrees, arguing that reduced benefits will only hurt stay at home mothers.
Economic Policy Analysis

You are asked to evaluate the situation:

- Theoretical Tools & Empirical Tools
- Positive Analysis: What will happen?
- Normative Analysis: What should happen?
Constrained Utility Maximization

- **indifference curves** = consumer preferences
- **non-satiation**
  - Consumers prefer higher indifference curves
  - Indifference Curves are downward sloping
  - Example: CDs and Movies
Figure 1: Indifference Curves & Marginal Rate of Substitution
Utility Functions

- \( U = f(X_1, X_2, \ldots, X_N) \)

- **marginal utility**: the incremental utility gained by an additional unit
  \[ MU_{X_1} = \frac{\partial U}{\partial X_1} \]

- **diminishing marginal utility**
  - Example: \( U = \sqrt{Q_C \times Q_M} \)
Utility Functions

- **Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS):** the rate at which consumers are willing to trade one good for another

  \[ MRS = \frac{-MU_M}{MU_C} \]

- Example: CDs and Movies
Budget Constraints

- Key contribution of economics: resources are limited
- **budget constraint**: mathematical representation of all affordable combinations of goods

\[ Y = P_C Q_C + P_M Q_M \]

- Example: CDs and Movies
Figure 2: Budget Constraint & Utility Maximization
Using indifference curves and budget constraints, we model consumer choice.

Optimal Bundle:

\[ MRS = \frac{-MU_M}{MU_C} = \frac{-P_M}{P_C} \]

Example: CDs and Movies
Comparative Statics

- We can also analyze the effects of changes in prices or income.
- A change in price creates a **substitution effect** and an **income effect**.
  - Example: CDs and Movies
Figure 3: Income & Substitution Effects
Demand Curves

- **Demand Curves**: the quantity of a good consumed at each price
- Using our analysis of consumer choice, we can predict quantities consumed at different prices
- Key feature of demand curve is the **elasticity of demand**

\[
\varepsilon_D = \frac{\text{Percent Change in } Q_D}{\text{Percent Change in Price}} = \frac{-\Delta Q/Q}{\Delta P/P}
\]

- Elasticity is usually not constant
- perfectly inelastic and perfectly elastic demand curves
- cross price elasticities
Figure 4: Demand Curves

(a) Demand Curves for CDs ($Q_C$) and Price of Movies ($P_M$)

- **$BC_2$** ($P_M = \$12$)
- **$BC_1$** ($P_M = \$8$)
- **$BC_3$** ($P_M = \$6$)

(b) Demand Curve for Movies ($D_M$)

Price of movies, $P_M$

- $B$ at $\$12$
- $A$
- $C$

Quantity of movies, $Q_M$

- 0 to 16
- 4, 6, 8 marks on the x-axis
Supply Curves

- **Supply Curves**: the quantity of a good agents (or firms) are willing to supply at each price
- Built up from similar microfoundations of profit maximization
- Key concept is marginal productivity
- When this is diminishing, **marginal costs** will be increasing
- The supply curve in a competitive market is the marginal cost curve, and will therefore be upward sloping
- Firms supply until price equals marginal cost
Market Equilibrium and Efficiency

- **market demand** and **market supply** are the horizontal sums of individual curves
- **market equilibrium**: the combination of price and quantity that satisfies both demand and supply
- competitive markets reach an equilibrium that is socially efficient (size of the pie)
Consumer and Producer Surplus

- **consumer surplus**: benefit to consumers beyond what they pay
- **producer surplus**: benefit to producers beyond the costs of production
- price elasticity partly determines the amount of surplus
Figure 5: Consumer Surplus

(a) 
(b) 
(c)
From Surplus to Welfare

How can we link the effects of price changes to consumer’s welfare? 3 key concepts

- Compensating variation (CV): what change in income would restore the consumer’s well-being to what it was before the price change

- Equivalent variation (EV): what change in the consumer’s income would have an equal effect on the consumer’s well-being as the price change

- Change in consumer’s surplus (ΔCS): area to the left of the demand curve between the before and after prices. We can go from willingness-to-pay to surplus to welfare as well

These are 3 possible money metric measures of the effect of a price change on welfare
Figure 6: Compensating Variation

Compensating Variation

\[ L^1 \text{ and } L^1 \]
\[ P_D = \text{price of DVDs} = \$20 \]
\[ P_C = \text{price of CDs} = \$15 \]
\[ M = \text{Income} = \$300. \]
Choice: \( e_1 \)

\[ L^2 \text{ and } L^2 \]
\[ P_D = \text{price of DVDs} = \$20 \]
\[ P_C = \text{price of CDs} = \$30 \]
\[ M = \text{Income} = \$300. \]
Choice: \( e_2 \)

\[ L^* \text{ and } L^1 \]
\[ P_D = \text{price of DVDs} = \$20 \]
\[ P_C = \text{price of CDs} = \$30 \]
\[ M = \text{Income} = \$450. \]
Choice: \( e^* \)

\[ CV = 450 - 300 = \$150 \]
Figure 7: Equivalent Variation

Equivalent Variation

L¹ and L¹
\[ P_D = \text{price of DVDs} = $20 \]
\[ P_C = \text{price of CDs} = $15 \]
\[ M = \text{Income} = $300. \]
Choice: \( e_1 \)

L² and L²
\[ P_D = \text{price of DVDs} = $20 \]
\[ P_C = \text{price of CDs} = $30 \]
\[ M = \text{Income} = $300. \]
Choice: \( e_2 \)

\[ EV = 300 - 200 = $100 \]
Figure 8: Consumer Surplus

Change in consumer surplus
Figure 9: Consumer Surplus and Preferences

(a) Willingness to Pay at Price $P_1$

The area under the demand curve measures the dollar value of the DVDs that would compensate for or be equivalent to $Q_1$ CDs.
From Surplus to Welfare (2)

- When no income effects, CV, EV and $\Delta CS$ are equivalent
  ex: Quasi Linear Utility functions
  $\Delta \text{Surplus}=\text{consistent dollar measures of the effect of the price change on the well-being of the consumer}$

- Advantage of surplus analysis: only 2 parameters to estimate (elasticity of demand, and elasticity of supply)

- When income effects are small (IO cases for instance), rely on surplus for welfare analysis is fine

- When income effects are potentially big (cf. UI, taxes, etc.), rely on utility and try to estimate parameters of the utility function.
Figure 10: Market Efficiency
Back to TANF

- TANF created in 1996 after overhaul of "cash welfare" programs
- Monthly support to low-income families (about $679 in 2003)
- Use micro tools to analyze TANF
- Need to model labor supply, using leisure as a good
Consider Amy who makes $10/hr
TANF supplies $5,000 guarantee
Benefit reduced at a rate of 50% (implicit tax)
What happens if benefit guarantee is cut to $3,000?
Effect of Change in TANF

- Remember income and substitution effects
- Depends on previous earnings
- What will the magnitude of the effect be?
- Consider Amy and Natalia

\[
U_{Amy} = 100 \times \ln(C) + 175 \times \ln(L)
\]
\[
U_{Natalia} = 75 \times \ln(C) + 300 \times \ln(L)
\]
Figure 11: Labor Supply 1

Food consumption (dollars)

$20,000

Leisure (hours)

2,000

Slope = -10

Budget constraint

Point A

Point B

Point C
Figure 12: Labor Supply 2

(a)
Figure 13: Labor Supply 3

(b)

Food consumption (dollars)

Leisure (hours)

Slope = -10

Slope = -5

A

B

C

D

E

F

$20,000

10,000

6,000

5,000

3,000

0

1,000

1,400

2,000
Figure 14: Labor Supply 4
Figure 15: Labor Supply 5

The diagram illustrates the trade-off between food consumption in dollars and leisure time in hours. The downward-sloping line represents the budget constraint, indicating how much food consumption can be obtained with different levels of leisure. Points A and B on the graph represent two different combinations of food consumption and leisure time. Point A is at (2,000 hours, $5,000) and point B is at (2,000 hours, $3,000).
Beyond the Effects of TANF Change

- Once we have decided what happens as a result of a change in TANF, we want to know the net gain or loss of this change.
- This will take us from the realm of **positive** analysis to **normative** analysis.
Effect of TANF on Market

- Workers are the suppliers of labor
- Firms are the buyers of labor
- The wage is the price paid for a unit of labor
  - Example: Introducing TANF and Reducing TANF
- Net social gain due to efficiency
- Need to consider equity
Figure 16: Efficiency Gains from TANF Reduction
Outline

From Utility Maximization to Market Efficiency

Fundamental Theorems of WE
  Efficiency
  Equity

Conclusion
Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics

- Simple intuition of the 2 theorems in a basic Edgeworth framework
- Discuss implications for public intervention
- See how welfare function approach can fit in
Figure 17: Edgeworth Box
Figure 18: Edgeworth Box
Figure 19: Edgeworth Box
Figure 20: Pareto Efficiency
Figure 21: Pareto Efficiency
Figure 22: Pareto Efficiency
Pareto Efficiency

- At a **Pareto Efficient** allocation indifference curves are tangent, and therefore:
  \[ MRS_{ST}^{Will} = MRS_{ST}^{Jada} \]

- There are multiple Pareto efficient allocations along the **contract curve**
Figure 23: The Contract Curve
Figure 24: The Contract Curve
Figure 25: The Contract Curve
Figure 26: The Contract Curve
In a simple Edgeworth box the amount of goods are fixed or exogenously determined

Alternatively, the economy may use inputs to produce turkey burgers and smoothies

The production technology will be captured by the production possibilities curve and the marginal rate of transformation ($MRS$)
Figure 27: Production Possibility Curve

\[ MRT = | \text{Slope of PPC} | \]
Pareto Efficiency with Production

- The marginal rate of transformation is the ratio of marginal costs of producing an additional unit of each good:

\[ MRT_{ST} = \frac{MC_S}{MC_T} \]

- At a Pareto efficient allocation, the marginal rate of is aligned with the marginal rates of substitution:

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At a Pareto efficient allocation, the marginal rate of is aligned with the marginal rates of substitution:

\[ MRT_{ST} = MRS^\text{Will}_{ST} = MRS^\text{Jada}_{ST} \]
A competitive market will reach a Pareto efficient allocation of goods if:

1. All producers and consumers are price takers
2. Markets are complete (i.e. a market exist for all commodities)
First Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics

- From consumer theory we have:

\[ MRS_{ST}^{\text{Will}} = \frac{P_S}{P_T} \quad \text{and} \quad MRS_{ST}^{\text{Jada}} = \frac{P_S}{P_T} \]

- From producer theory we have:

\[ MRT_{ST} = \frac{P_S}{P_T} \]

- Therefore, we have:

\[ MRT_{ST} = MRS_{ST}^{\text{Will}} = MRS_{ST}^{\text{Jada}} \quad \implies \quad \frac{P_S}{P_T} = \frac{MC_S}{MC_T} \]

- So, should government just get out of the way?
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- So, should government just get out of the way?
Fairness versus Efficiency

- The FFTWE may imply that there is little role for government in the economy
- Competitive markets lead to Pareto efficient allocations
- However, efficiency may not be the only goal for society
- We may also have a desire for some sort of equitable distribution of goods
Figure 28: Distribution and Pareto efficiency
Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics (SFTWE)

- How do we arrive at different efficient allocations?
- The SFTWE states that we can reach any Pareto efficient allocation by altering the initial endowments of resources. In other words, we just have to redistribute income and from there the market will do the rest.
- Thus, in theory, efficiency and equity issues can be addressed separately.
- In practice, these "lump sum" redistributions are not feasible, leaving us with an efficiency-equity trade-off.
- In that case, we need a framework for deciding how much of a trade-off society should make.
The contract curve defines a set of possible utility combinations

We can plot these combinations on the utility possibility curve (upc)

Note that this curve serves much the same purpose as a production possibilities curve or budget constraint, capturing the trade-off inherent in different utility outcomes
Figure 29: Utility Possibility Curve
Social Welfare Function

- How do we rank the possible utility outcomes?
- One way is to define a **Social Welfare Function (SWF)**: 
  \[ W = f(U_{Will}, U_{Jada}) \]
- The SWF behaves as a utility function for society, and, for example, has indifference curves
- This combined with the upc directs us toward the social optimum
Figure 30: SWF Maximization
Social Welfare Function

- What are the features of the SWF?
- Typically the SWF is an increasing function of all of its arguments:
  \[ \frac{\partial W}{\partial U_{\text{Will}}} > 0 \]
- A **Utilitarian SWF** is linear in form:
  \[ W_{\text{Utilitarian}} = U_{\text{Will}} + U_{\text{Jada}} \]
- A **Rawlsian SWF** places more weight on society’s worse off:
  \[ W_{\text{Rawlsian}} = \min(U_{\text{Will}}, U_{\text{Jada}}) \]
- Concavity in the SWF leads to a preference for equality
- Usually it is not possible to build up a coherent SWF using individual’s utilities (Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem)
Outline

From Utility Maximization to Market Efficiency

Fundamental Theorems of WE

Conclusion
Violations of the FFTWE and Public Policies

- Aside from distributional concerns, there are other reasons why one might consider a larger role for government intervention.
- When the assumptions underlying the FFTWE breakdown, we have what is called Market Failures.
- There are three major types of breakdowns:
  1. **Market Power**: The assumption of perfect competition may not always hold. In that case, firms may not set price equal to marginal costs, violating our conditions of Pareto Efficiency.
  2. **Under or overprovision of goods because of positive or negative externalities**.
  3. **Non provision of goods**: It may not be the case that a market exists for every commodity. Some examples include:
     - Asymmetric information and the collapse of insurance markets.
     - Public good for which no one entity is willing to supply to the market.
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