Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?

LUCA ANDERLINI, LEONARDO FELLI, and ANDREW POSTLEWAITE

Georgetown University; London School of Economics; University of Pennsylvania

We find an economic rationale for the common sense answer to the question in our title — courts (that maximize parties’ welfare under a veil of ignorance) should not always enforce what the contracting parties write. Courts can improve on the outcome that the parties would achieve without their intervention. We study a buyer-seller model with risk-neutral agents and asymmetric information. The court must decide when to uphold a contract and when to void it. The parties know their private information at the time of contracting, and this drives a wedge between ex-ante and interim-efficient contracts. In particular, if the court enforces all contracts, inefficient pooling obtains in equilibrium. By voiding some contracts the court is able to induce them to separate, and hence improve ex-ante welfare. Our results can also be interpreted as supporting the normative case for mandatory rules in contract law.

1. INTRODUCTION

Courts are active players in contractual relationships between economic agents. They routinely intervene in contractual disputes, excusing performance called for in the contract because of intervening events. Yet, in most of modern economic theory courts are treated (often not even modeled, but left in the background) as passive enforcers of the will of the parties embodied in their contractual agreements.

This simplistic view of the role of courts stems from the fact that in a world with complete contracts, to behave as a passive enforcer is clearly the best that a court interested in maximizing contracting parties’ welfare can do. In the “classical” world of modern economic theory, contracts are complete.

In a world in which complete contracts are not feasible it is no longer obvious that a court should be a passive enforcer, and in fact it is no longer
true. For example, the contracting parties may face some uninsurable risk and the court may improve their welfare if it is able to use some information available ex-post and excuse performance in some eventualities.\footnote{2}

Once the way for an active court is open, a host of related questions naturally arise. The aim of this paper is to address the following one. Suppose that the court cannot condition (ex-ante or ex-post) on any variable that cannot be contracted on by the parties themselves. Is it then the case that the court’s intervention can play any welfare-enhancing role?

The answer to the question above is “yes” if the parties are asymmetrically informed at the time they contract and the court maximizes their ex-ante welfare, that is, their expected welfare before either party gets information not available to the other. Asymmetry in the parties’ information at the time they contract can lead to a “lemons-like” situation in which adverse selection leads to inefficient contracts. Courts that do not simply enforce contracts as they are written can sometimes ameliorate the inefficiency that results from asymmetric information.

We provide an example in which this is indeed the case. We also derive the optimal decision rule for an active welfare-maximizing court. This rule implies that the court in equilibrium voids contracts that the contracting parties, at the contracting stage, would like the court to enforce.

The potential benefit of a court’s voiding explicit contractual clauses stems from asymmetry of information between the parties at the time they contract. Because of asymmetric information, when the court does not intervene, inefficient trades may take place. This is because in the absence of the court’s intervention the contracting party that does have private information may have an incentive not to disclose it. This will force the other party to accept the contract while still uninformed, possibly luring him into an inefficient trade. In other words, some (inefficient) pooling may obtain. By intervening and voiding some contractual clauses, the court may be able to negate the incentives for the informed party to hide his private information, thus making the pooling no longer profitable for him. In other words, voiding contracts in some cases will decrease the expected gain from withholding private information, thereby promoting disclosure and hence increasing ex-ante welfare.\footnote{3} In the example below the court’s intervention takes the form of voiding extreme contracts: trading contracts that specify exceedingly high prices.

The view that courts should maximize ex-ante welfare is a compelling one. If the parties were able to meet at the ex-ante stage (when they are symmetrically informed), agreements could be reached that circumvent
inefficiencies that are unavoidable at the interim stage when the parties have private information. A court that maximizes ex-ante expected welfare will choose the same contingent rules of behavior as the parties would have chosen at that stage, had it been possible. In other words, if the parties could meet at that point, they might instruct the court to void some contracts they might subsequently write. They will do this precisely because the parties will understand that while they may regret this in some circumstances, it may promote the disclosure of private information and in expectation they will be better off. The problem that the court is solving is that the parties are often unable to meet before the arrival of their private information. In other words, a court that maximizes ex-ante welfare acts as a commitment device that remedies the parties’ inability to contract at the ex-ante stage.

We model the court as a “Stackelberg leader.” Before any uncertainty is realized and any contracts are drawn up, the court publicly announces the rules that it will follow to settle a possible dispute. Courts do not in actuality commit to the rules by which disputes will be settled; instead, courts decide after they know the details of the dispute. Nevertheless, over time the accumulated decisions that courts have made in a broad array of cases creates a set of precedents that shape how future disputes will be settled. The rule of precedents (stare decisis) guarantees that a court, when asked to rule on a dispute is bound, at least to some extent, by the ruling implied by the accumulated precedents. Rather than model this gradual evolution of the way contractual disputes are resolved, we treat the court as choosing, once and for all, an optimal rule.

Our aim is not to suggest that there is an easy rule that courts can apply to void particular contracts that come before them. Indeed, in the example below, a court would need substantial detail on the parties’ circumstances to know precisely when contractual performance should be excused. Rather, the central point is that there are circumstances in which voiding contracts that parties would like the court to uphold can be welfare-enhancing.

It is clear that our arguments apply equally well to legislators choosing whether to impose any mandatory rules in contract law. That these rules will be anticipated by the parties is trivial in this case. Equally clear is that our arguments above also constitute a compelling case for the fact that the normative role of legislators should be that of maximizing the parties’ ex-ante welfare.

In our view, the key difference between these two interpretations is informational. Our results show that court intervention is optimal in some cases. In just the same way, mandatory rules will be welfare-enhancing when
aimed at some subset of contracting parties but not when aimed at others. It seems likely that, especially in a regime of “case law,” courts will be able to better tailor their intervention to the class of cases that needs it than the legislators. Statute books are changed less often than cases are ruled on by courts, and the information available to legislators is less sensitive to the heterogeneity of characteristics of the pool of cases that the courts review.

Throughout the paper, we give more emphasis to the interpretation of our results concerning court intervention as opposed to mandatory rules because of this last consideration. Nevertheless, we believe that our results are useful in both guises.

1.1. THE ROLE OF COURTS IN PROMOTING DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION

Our aim is to highlight how the rules that courts use in adjudicating contractual issues can potentially increase the information available to contracting parties, and consequently, affect the parties’ welfare. Historically, courts have had an interest in promoting disclosure of information at least since the English case of Hadley vs. Baxendale in 1854. The court held in that case that a defendant who breached a contract was liable only for damages that might reasonably have arisen given the known facts rather than the higher damages that were actually suffered because of circumstances known only to the plaintiff. As argued in Adler (1999), the limitation on damages implicit in the Hadley rule is a default that is often viewed as promoting disclosure: “A party who will suffer exceptional damages from breach need only communicate her situation in advance and gain assent to allowance so that the damages are unmistakably in the contemplation of both parties at the time of contract.”

The discussion of the role of courts in promoting information disclosure, to our knowledge, focuses primarily on the benefit of disclosure to the contracting parties. In the absence of disclosure, resources will be wasted in writing needless waiver clauses and inefficient precaution.

Courts will have an interest in promoting disclosure of information in our model, but for a very different reason, and with very different consequences. Courts will affect the amount of information that is revealed by informed parties through their treatment of contracts that reveal little information. While contracts may reveal little information simply because the parties have little information, courts will treat such contracts more harshly than they otherwise might because of the incentive effects such treatment will have on informed parties. Those with relevant information will reveal it in order that courts will more likely enforce the agreements that are made. Thus, courts
are not examining a contract brought before them solely to uncover the parties’ intent. They also take into consideration how the treatment of the contract will affect contracting parties different from the parties before them but affected by the court’s ruling via precedents.

In this paper, the Court (or the legislature, as discussed above) achieves its goal of enhancing efficiency by means of anticipated actions that are akin to “mandatory” or “immutable” rules; rules that the contracting parties cannot modify at the negotiation stage. These rules need to be mandatory given the conflict of interest, described above, between the objectives of the parties at the contracting stage and the court’s objectives. Interestingly, in the extant literature the discussion of Hadley vs. Baxendale, on the other hand, has mainly focused on the use of “default” rules, rules that apply only in the absence of explicit contractual provisions by the parties.

1.2. RELATED LITERATURE

In section 2 of their chapter for Polinsky & Shavell’s Handbook of Law and Economics, Hermelin, Katz, and Craswell (2007) offer a systematic and comprehensive review of the existing literature presenting arguments “for” and “against” the “freedom of contract.” This paper is a contribution to this literature, presenting a robust set of circumstances in which the case “against” the “freedom of contract” (interpreted in its broadest sense) prevails. Their systematic and authoritative survey discusses the roles of traditional (third-party) externalities, asymmetric information, market power, bounded rationality, and distributional fairness as possible set-ups for the case in favor of restricting the parties’ freedom to contract at will. Our contribution is one that reinforces the case for such partial restrictions based on asymmetric information.

There is a growing literature that explicitly models the role of courts in contractual relationships. In a moral hazard set-up, Bond (2009) analyzes optimal contracting between parties when judges can impose an outcome other than the contracted outcome in exchange for a bribe. Bond shows that in a simple agency model, this possibility will make the contracting parties less likely to employ high-powered contracts. Usman (2002) also focuses on a moral hazard environment. He lays out a model in which contracts contain variables that are not observable to courts unless a rational and self-interested judge exerts costly effort. His analysis concentrates on contracting behavior and the incentive to breach when judges value the correct ruling but dislike effort. Levy (2005) analyzes the trade-off that arises when the judge in ruling on a dispute is, at the same time, trying to influence the perception of the
public (or an evaluator) about his own ability. This trade-off can induce the judge to distort his decision to avoid it being appealed and possibly reversed.

The courts in these papers are governed by a judge who maximizes his or her personal utility. In contrast to these papers, there is a literature that analyzes courts that maximize the expected welfare of the contracting parties. Posner (1998) analyzes whether a court should consider information extrinsic to the contract in interpreting the contract. Closer to the current paper, Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) analyze the degree to which courts’ interpretation of contracts affect incentives to reveal private information. The focus of this work is the effect of different court rules regarding damages for breach of contract on the incentives for parties to disclose information regarding the costs of breach at the time of contracting. Shavell (2006) presents a general examination of the role of courts in interpreting contracts.

The present paper analyzes the role of a welfare-maximizing court that can affect the type of contracts that are written by excusing performance (voiding the contract) in some circumstances. The possibility of welfare improvements is a consequence of the effect of the court’s rules for enforcing contracts on the parties’ incentives to reveal private information. Our paper differs from Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991) in that we focus on the externality that informed contracting parties may impose on uninformed contracting parties, which is absent from these papers. In fact, in both of these contributions, the welfare gains from information disclosure stem from the fact that once information is disclosed a different action can be implemented by one of the contracting parties.9

In different contexts, several papers have made the point that in the presence of asymmetric information inefficiency may arise (Aghion and Hermain, 1990; Hammond, 2005; Spier, 1992). These papers show that cream skimming (Hammond, 2005) and, in general, the incentive to signal private information can yield inefficient (and possibly incomplete) contracts (Spier, 1992), and hence welfare can be enhanced by limiting (by means of the law or regulations) these signalling possibilities (Aghion and Hermain, 1990). Our paper differs from this branch of the literature in that in our environment the inefficiencies arise because of the lack of disclosure of private information, rather than a tendency to inefficiency-generating signaling. Our Court, by not enforcing certain contracts, may enhance ex-ante efficiency by facilitating and not hampering the disclosure of private information.

A paper that similarly addresses the role of a court in dealing with contractual issues is Schwartz and Scott (2003). In that paper the authors
advocate a Commercial Law that differs from current US arrangements in three main respects. When disciplining trade between sophisticated parties in the absence of any externalities, Commercial Law should limit considerably the use of default rules (rules that apply in the absence of explicit prescriptions by the contracting parties). The rationale for this prescription is that general default rules simply increase the transaction costs faced by the sophisticated contracting parties. Moreover, Contract Law should limit any ambiguities in the way contractual clauses are enforced, and therefore minimize the chances of having to resort to a Court’s (uncertain) interpretation of existing rules. Finally, Commercial Law should specify no “mandatory” or “immutable” rules that the parties cannot change.

Clearly the prescriptions in Schwartz and Scott (2003) differ substantially from the conclusions we draw in this paper. In the environment we describe, in the presence of sophisticated but asymmetrically informed parties mandatory rules might be desirable; they are welfare-enhancing.

The literature on mandatory rules is large, and we refer the reader to the comprehensive contribution of Hermelin, Katz, and Craswell (2007). Perhaps the most prominent advocate of the absence of mandatory rules is Posner (2003), who argues that contract theory cannot prescribe “universally” useful contractual prohibitions, and hence, the case against mandatory rules is sealed. Craswell (2003) on the other hand persuasively (in our view) argues that the fact that contract theory is unable to offer “universal” conclusions does not imply that, on balance, across a pool of heterogeneous cases, mandatory rules may not be justified. Hermelin and Katz (1993) argue that, in general, mandatory rules will not have beneficial effects when contracting takes place in a “screening” set-up. Their conclusion is of course consistent with the main message coming out of the literature on wasteful signaling that we discussed above.

Lastly, the welfare-enhancing court intervention (or mandatory rule, or regulation) that we identify here is to impose a price cap in some cases. The literature on price caps goes back a long way in Industrial Organization, with arguments for and against price caps as, for example, a way to contain the effects of market power.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to survey this field, and the reader is referred to textbooks such as Clarkson and Miller (1982), Tirole (1988), Carlton and Perloff (1994) or, more recently, Belleflamme and Peitz (2010). It is interesting to note that our results support a welfare-enhancing role for price caps in a context with asymmetric information. This seems to be novel as far as we are aware. In contrast to our results, Earle, Schmedders, and

http://www.bepress.com/rle/vol7/iss1/art2
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Tatur (2007) find that under conditions of price uncertainty price caps can have important negative welfare effects.

2. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE

2.1. BASICS
Our central point can be made via a simple example. There exists a buyer $B$ and a seller $S$, with a single indivisible object (a “widget”) potentially available for trade.

The seller has private information at the time of contracting. He knows his type, which can be either $b$ (ad) or $g$ (ood). Each type is equally likely, and the buyer does not know $S$’s type.

Depending on $S$’s type, the value and cost of the widget are either $v_b$ and $c_b$ or $v_g$ and $c_g$ respectively. A seller of type $b$ is “bad news” in two ways. First, the cost of the widget is higher. Second, while the surplus for a good seller is positive, it is negative when the seller is bad. In other words, we assume that

$$c_g < c_b$$

and

$$v_b - c_b < 0 < v_g - c_g$$

(1)

To make the model interesting, we also assume that

$$\frac{v_b + v_g}{2} > c_b$$

(2)

which of course— to gether with (1)— implies that expected surplus is positive.

The informed seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of a price $p$ to the uninformed buyer. The buyer then accepts or rejects. If the offer is rejected both earn a payoff of zero.

2.2. COURTS
As we mentioned above, our courts are Stackelberg leaders. They announce which contracts will be enforced and which will be voided. To see specifically what effects a voiding rule will have on the equilibrium of the model, we need to specify the — off-the-equilibrium-path as it turns out — payoffs associated with contracts that the court will void.

Suppose that the seller offers a contract that the court has announced it will void, possibly with a buyer who accepts the offer. What are the correct payoffs to the parties in this case? Obviously there is considerable latitude in specifying these values. One could imagine penalties for offering and/or
accepting the contract. Or a seller who winds up with positive probability of delivering the widget — and thus incurring the cost — but, not having recourse to a court, unable to exact the payment from the buyer. Further, we could imagine relationship-specific ex-ante investments that are not recouped once the contract is voided and renegotiation takes place.\cite{12}

Our results below are robust to the precise specification of payoffs associated with a voided contract. They remain true provided that offering a contract that is accepted and then voided by the court is no better than no transaction at all as far as the seller is concerned. In other words, it is sufficient that somehow a contract that is voided by the court prevents trade from taking place.

### 2.3. Equilibrium with a Passive Court

As we suggested above, when all contracts are enforced, inefficient pooling can obtain in equilibrium. When the value of the good widget, \(v_g\), is sufficiently high, there will typically be multiple pooling equilibria in which both types of seller offer the same price. When the seller types are pooled, the buyer will not know which type of widget is being offered, and will value it at the average of the values of the good and bad widget. As long as the price offered by the seller is below this average value, the buyer will accept the offer. The optimal pooling contract for the seller is then one in which the price at which the widget is offered, \(p\), is the average value: \(\frac{v_g + v_b}{2}\), since any offer at a higher price will be rejected.

There may also exist a separating equilibrium in which the two types of seller offer different prices, \(p_g \neq p_b\) and in doing so they reveal their type. When the prices offered by the two types of seller differ, the buyer will not accept the offer at price \(p_b\) if \(p_b > v_b\). Since \(v_b < c_b\), any price \(p_b\) at which the buyer would be willing to buy would result in a loss for the seller. Hence, for there to be a separating equilibrium with different prices offered by the two types of sellers, the buyer must reject the offer from the bad seller, which results in a payoff of 0 to that seller. This can be optimal for the bad seller if \(p_g \leq c_b\); in this case, the price offered by the good seller is less than or equal to the cost of the bad seller, and consequently the bad seller cannot gain by offering the good seller’s price \(p_g\). We have assumed that \(c_g < c_b\), so there can be separating equilibria in which the two types offer prices \(p_g \neq p_b\), \(p_g \in [c_g, c_b]\), with the buyer accepting the offer at \(p_g\) and rejecting the offer at \(p_b\).\cite{13}

The payoff is 0 to the bad seller in any separating equilibrium, while the payoff to the good seller in any separating equilibrium is obviously highest.
when \( p_g = c_b \). If \( (v_g + v_b)/2 > c_b \), the optimal pooling equilibrium described above is the best possible equilibrium for both types of seller. We summarize this argument in the following proposition.

**PROPOSITION 1. Equilibrium with a Passive Court:** Suppose the court enforces all contracts. For \( v_b \) sufficiently large, there is a unique equilibrium that is optimal for both types of seller in which they pool in offering to trade at the same price \( p = (v_g + v_b)/2 \).14

A pooling equilibrium in which the buyer accepts the offer from both types of seller is clearly inefficient. The expected surplus in this case is equal to

\[
w_p = \frac{v_b - c_b + v_g - c_g}{2} \tag{3}
\]

which, by (1) is obviously lower than what expected surplus would be in a first-best scenario in which trade takes place if and only if \( S \) is of type \( g \). In this case, expected surplus would be

\[
w_f = \frac{v_g - c_g}{2} \tag{4}
\]

**2.4. EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN ACTIVE COURT**

We now consider a court that actively intervenes and voids some contracts. In so doing the court will be able to induce separation between the two types of seller and increase expected welfare. The court can adopt a simple policy of voiding “extreme” contracts by imposing a price cap. This will rule out the range of prices at which the bad seller wants to pool, thus forcing separation, and hence preventing the sale from taking place when the seller is bad. This, as we remarked above, will raise expected surplus from \( W_p \), as in (3), to \( W_f \), as in (4).

**PROPOSITION 2. Equilibrium with an Active Court:** Assume the court announces that it will void all contracts with a price \( p \) exceeding some price cap \( \overline{p} \) such that \( c_g \leq \overline{p} < \min\{v_g, c_b\} \). Then there is a unique equilibrium payoff that weakly Pareto dominates all other equilibrium payoffs for both types of seller. This payoff is obtained when the two types of seller separate: the good seller offers a price \( \overline{p} \) and the bad seller does not transact.
Suppose that we have a pooling equilibrium at an offered price $p = p_b = p_g \leq p$. Since $p < c_b$, the bad seller will have a negative payoff if the offer is accepted. He can do better by not trading, which he can accomplish by setting a sufficiently high price. Hence, the only possibility of a pooling equilibrium at which $p$ is offered by both types of seller must involve the buyer refusing.

There will be separating equilibria in which the good seller announces a price $p_g \in (c_g, p]$ and the bad seller does not trade (say, by announcing a price $p_b > v_g$).\(^{15}\) Since $p_g > c_g$ assures that the good seller has a positive payoff at this price, $p_g \leq p$ guarantees both that the seller will accept the offer and that the court will not void the contract, and $p_g \leq c_g$ assures that the bad seller cannot get a positive payoff by replicating the good seller’s offer.

Thus, when the court uses this rule to void contracts, the bad seller cannot obtain a positive payoff at any equilibrium. The unique equilibrium payoff that weakly Pareto dominates all other equilibrium payoffs entails the good seller setting $p_g = p$ and the bad seller not trading.

3. CONCLUSION

When contracting parties are asymmetrically informed, a benevolent court that maximizes the parties’ ex-ante welfare can enhance efficiency by voiding certain aspects of the contract that the parties at the negotiation stage would like the court to uphold. In particular, our example above shows that the court can accomplish this by voiding extreme contracts: trading contracts that specify very high prices.

In a more general setting the welfare-enhancing role of the court can take different forms of intervention. For example, in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) the court can enhance efficiency by voiding the trade of a specific widget whatever the specified price. Moreover, efficiency can be further increased if the court’s intervention does not occur with certainty. In other words, the incentives of an informed party to reveal his private information at the negotiation stage are enhanced by the mere possibility (but not necessarily the certainty) of the court’s intervention. In Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) this is achieved by the court committing, at the ex-ante stage, to randomize with a given probability between voiding and upholding the trade of a given widget. The randomizing behavior of a court may appear at first glance to be an unrealistic stratagem. We do not think so. Indeed, in order to create the right incentives for the parties to disclose the relevant private information, it is enough that the existing body of precedents is
ambiguous enough to lead the parties to believe that the relevant aspect of the contract will be voided by the court with the desired probability. It is undeniable that in reality laws and the body of precedents are sufficiently ambiguous in many cases.

Our main result (Propositions 1 and 2) can be viewed as identifying a kind of “second-best” phenomenon in an incomplete contract world. We start with a model in which some degree of contractual incompleteness is assumed (the costs and values of each widget are not verifiable and hence not contractible). In this world it is in fact welfare-improving to impose further incompleteness by making some contracts effectively impossible in equilibrium. This is what our active court does. This is similar to the finding in Bernheim and Whinston (1998) that under some conditions, when one assumes that contracts are exogenously coarse, equilibrium contracts may be even coarser than the constraints impose. However, our main result differs from theirs in that it does not assert that contracts will be coarse (or incomplete) in equilibrium. Rather, it asserts that imposing further incompleteness can increase expected welfare.

We conclude by remarking again that the prescriptions we have derived that pinpoint how active courts should intervene can also be interpreted as telling us how mandatory rules should be designed. This paper is, in a sense, agnostic about this. In either case we identify the welfare-enhancing role of an ex-ante commitment to void certain aspects of a contract. Whether we can interpret our results as indicating a role for active courts or a role for mandatory rules depends on whether the rule that the Court commits to is the result of an accumulated body of precedents (it is case law) or instead is part of a statute designed by a legislator. As we noted in the introduction, the information on which the court can condition its intervention is likely to be finer than that available to the legislators designing mandatory rules.
Endnotes

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2. This is the case, for example, in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2007).

3. In our example below, the court’s intervention is not just welfare-enhancing; it achieves the actual first-best. Obviously, this need not be the case in general. For example, in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2007) the court’s intervention is welfare-enhancing, but does not achieve the first-best.

4. The definition of stare decisis from the Wex on-line legal dictionary and encyclopedia at Cornell University Law School (http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/Stare_decisis) reads as follows: “Latin for ‘to stand by things decided.’ Stare decisis is essentially the doctrine of precedent. Courts cite to stare decisis when an issue has been previously brought to the court and a ruling already issued. Generally, courts will adhere to the previous ruling, though this is not universally true.”

5. See Anderlini, Felli, and Riboni (2010) for a paper that explicitly models the dynamic evolution of precedents and its implications for the efficiency of court rulings.

6. The role of legislators in shaping mandatory rules is also clearly akin to the role of regulators in certain markets.

7. 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145. (Court of Exchequer, 1854).


9. In both cases, this is the level of effort of one of the parties; specifically the level of “care” exercised by Baxendale in Hadley vs Baxendale (see endnote 7 above).

10. We refer the interested reader to our working paper (Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite, 2006) for a richer model that allows some additional points to be brought to the fore. In particular, our set-up here does not allow us to focus on the possibility that an ambiguous Court may also be welfare-improving. We return to this point in Section 3.

11. Extreme bargaining power in favor of the informed seller greatly simplifies the analysis. Results with the same flavor can easily be obtained in situations with intermediate bargaining power. What seems important is that the bargaining power should not reside entirely with the uninformed side.

12. As in Anderlini, Felli, and Postlewaite (2006) a relationship-specific ex-ante investment could yield no trade when the court voids the contractual agreement. Assume, for
simplicity, that while the seller has all the bargaining power at an ex-ante stage, if the contract is voided and parties trade ex-post the bargaining power shifts to the buyer. Then postulate a relationship-specific investment stage in which the informed seller can invest or not, with the trade surplus vanishing if $S$ does not invest. If the contract is voided by the court, the parties then enter a renegotiation stage in which the buyer has all the bargaining power, so he makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller. This clearly will expropriate any surplus the seller may have enjoyed (his investment is sunk at that stage) implying that if the seller expects the court to void the contract he will not invest and hence trade will not occur. We do not make explicit the formalities of this “addition” to the model since they are straightforward and do not add much to the intuitive outline we have just given here.

13. If the buyer’s beliefs are that prices other than $p_b$ and $p_g$ are offered by a bad seller, offers at these prices will be rejected.

14. We focus on the equilibrium in this example that is optimal for both types of seller because it is eminently plausible. We should note, however, that it is the unique equilibrium in this example that satisfies the undefeated refinement criterion (see Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Postlewaite, 1993).

15. We assume that any other offered price is believed to come from the bad seller.

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