CHAPTER 2

Human Capital and Signaling

1. The Basic Model of Labor Market Signaling

The models we have discussed so far are broadly in the tradition of Becker’s approach to human capital. Human capital is viewed as an input in the production process. The leading alternative is to view education purely as a signal. Consider the following simple model to illustrate the issues.

There are two types of workers, high ability and low ability. The fraction of high ability workers in the population is $\lambda$. Workers know their own ability, but employers do not observe this directly. High ability workers always produce $y_H$, while low ability workers produce $y_L$. In addition, workers can obtain education. The cost of obtaining education is $c_H$ for high ability workers and $c_L$ for low ability workers. The crucial assumption is that $c_L > c_H$, that is, education is more costly for low ability workers. This is often referred to as the “single-crossing” assumption, since it makes sure that in the space of education and wages, the indifference curves of high and low types intersect only once. For future reference, let us denote the decision to obtain education by $e = 1$.

For simplicity, we assume that education does not increase the productivity of either type of worker. Once workers obtain their education, there is competition among a large number of risk-neutral firms, so workers will be paid their expected productivity. More specifically, the timing of events is as follows:

- Each worker finds out their ability.
- Each worker chooses education, $e = 0$ or $e = 1$.
- A large number of firms observe the education decision of each worker (but not their ability) and compete a la Bertrand to hire these workers.
Clearly, this environment corresponds to a dynamic game of incomplete information, since individuals know their ability, but firms do not. In natural equilibrium concept in this case is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. Recall that a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium consists of a strategy profile $\sigma$ (designating a strategy for each player) and a brief profile $\mu$ (designating the beliefs of each player at each information set) such that $\sigma$ is *sequentially rational* for each player given $\mu$ (so that each player plays the best response in each information set given their beliefs) and $\mu$ is derived from $\sigma$ using Bayes’s rule whenever possible. While Perfect Bayesian Equilibria are straightforward to characterize and often reasonable, in incomplete information games where players with private information move before those without this information, there may also exist Perfect Bayesian Equilibria with certain undesirable characteristics. We may therefore wish to strengthen this notion of equilibrium (see below).

In general, there can be two types of equilibria in this game.

1. Separating, where high and low ability workers choose different levels of schooling, and as a result, in equilibrium, employers can infer worker ability from education (which is a straightforward application of Bayesian updating).

2. Pooling, where high and low ability workers choose the same level of education.

In addition, there can be semi-separating equilibria, where some education levels are chosen by more than one type.

1.1. A *separating equilibrium*. Let us start by characterizing a possible separating equilibrium, which illustrates how education can be valued, even though it has no directly productive role.

Suppose that we have

\begin{equation}
    y_H - c_H > y_L > y_H - c_L
\end{equation}

36
This is clearly possible since $c_H < c_L$. Then the following is an equilibrium: all high ability workers obtain education, and all low ability workers choose no education. Wages (conditional on education) are:

$$w(e = 1) = y_H \text{ and } w(e = 0) = y_L$$

Notice that these wages are conditioned on education, and not directly on ability, since ability is not observed by employers. Let us now check that all parties are playing best responses. First consider firms. Given the strategies of workers (to obtain education for high ability and not to obtain education for low ability), a worker with education has productivity $y_H$ while a worker with no education has productivity $y_L$. So no firm can change its behavior and increase its profits.

What about workers? If a high ability worker deviates to no education, he will obtain $w(e = 0) = y_L$, whereas he’s currently getting $w(e = 1) - c_H = y_H - c_H > y_L$. If a low ability worker deviates to obtaining education, the market will perceive him as a high ability worker, and pay him the higher wage $w(e = 1) = y_H$. But from (2.1), we have that $y_H - c_L < y_L$, so this deviation is not profitable for a low ability worker, proving that the separating allocation is indeed an equilibrium.

In this equilibrium, education is valued simply because it is a signal about ability. Education can be a signal about ability because of the single-crossing property. This can be easily verified by considering the case in which $c_L \leq c_H$. Then we could never have condition (2.1) hold, so it would not be possible to convince high ability workers to obtain education, while deterring low ability workers from doing so.

Notice also that if the game was one of perfect information, that is, the worker type were publicly observed, there could never be education investments here. This is an extreme result, due to the assumption that education has no productivity benefits. But it illustrates the forces at work.

### 1.2. Pooling equilibria in signaling games

However, the separating equilibrium is not the only one. Consider the following allocation: both low and high
ability workers do not obtain education, and the wage structure is

\[ w(e = 1) = (1 - \lambda)y_L + \lambda y_H \text{ and } w(e = 0) = (1 - \lambda)y_L + \lambda y_H \]

It is straightforward to check that no worker has any incentive to obtain education (given that education is costly, and there are no rewards to obtaining it). Since all workers choose no education, the expected productivity of a worker with no education is \((1 - \lambda)y_L + \lambda y_H\), so firms are playing best responses. (In Nash Equilibrium and Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, what they do in response to a deviation by a worker who obtains education is not important, since this does not happen along the equilibrium path).

What is happening here is that the market does not view education as a good signal, so a worker who “deviates” and obtains education is viewed as an average-ability worker, not as a high-ability worker.

What we have just described is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. But is it reasonable? The answer is no. This equilibrium is being supported by the belief that the worker who gets education is no better than a worker who does not. But education is more costly for low ability workers, so they should be less likely to deviate to obtaining education. There are many refinements in game theory which basically try to restrict beliefs in information sets that are not reached along the equilibrium path, ensuring that “unreasonable” beliefs, such as those that think a deviation to obtaining education is more likely from a low ability worker, are ruled out.

Perhaps the simplest is The Intuitive Criterion introduced by Cho and Kreps. The underlying idea is as follows. If there exists a type who will never benefit from taking a particular deviation, then the uninformed parties (here the firms) should deduce that this deviation is very unlikely to come from this type. This falls within the category of “forward induction” where rather than solving the game simply backwards, we think about what type of inferences will others derive from a deviation.
To illustrate the main idea, let us simplify the discussion by slightly strengthening condition (2.1) to

\[ y_H - c_H > (1 - \lambda) y_L + \lambda y_H \quad \text{and} \quad y_L > y_H - c_L. \]

Now take the pooling equilibrium above. Consider a deviation to \( e = 1 \). There is no circumstance under which the low type would benefit from this deviation, since by assumption (2.2) we have \( y_L > y_H - c_L \), and the most a worker could ever get is \( y_H \), and the low ability worker is now getting \( (1 - \lambda) y_L + \lambda y_H \). Therefore, firms can deduce that the deviation to \( e = 1 \) must be coming from the high type, and offer him a wage of \( y_H \). Then (2.2) also ensures that this deviation is profitable for the high types, breaking the pooling equilibrium.

The reason why this refinement is referred to as “The Intuitive Criterion” is that it can be supported by a relatively intuitive “speech” by the deviator along the following lines: “you have to deduce that I must be the high type deviating to \( e = 1 \), since low types would never ever consider such a deviation, whereas I would find it profitable if I could convince you that I am indeed the high type).” You should bear in mind that this speech is used simply as a loose and intuitive description of the reasoning underlying this equilibrium refinement. In practice there are no such speeches, because the possibility of making such speeches has not been modeled as part of the game. Nevertheless, this heuristic device gives the basic idea.

The overall conclusion is that as long as the separating condition is satisfied, we expect the equilibrium of this economy to involve a separating allocation, where education is valued as a signal.

2. Generalizations

It is straightforward to generalize this equilibrium concept to a situation in which education has a productive role as well as a signaling role. Then the story would be one where education is valued for more than its productive effect, because it is also associated with higher ability.
Let me give the basic idea here. Imagine that education is continuous $e \in [0, \infty)$. And the cost functions for the high and low types are $c_H(e)$ and $c_L(e)$, which are both strictly increasing and convex, with $c_H(0) = c_L(0) = 0$. The single crossing property is that

$$c'_H(e) < c'_L(e) \text{ for all } e \in [0, \infty),$$

that is, the marginal cost of investing in a given unit of education is always higher for the low type. Figure 3.1 shows these cost functions.

Moreover, suppose that the output of the two types as a function of their educations are $y_H(e)$ and $y_L(e)$, with

$$y_H(e) > y_L(e) \text{ for all } e.$$

Figure 2.2 shows the first-best, which would arise in the absence of incomplete information.
Figure 2.2. The first best allocation with complete information.

In particular, as the figure shows, the first best involves effort levels \((e_l^*, e_h^*)\) such that

\[
y'_L (e_l^*) = c'_L (e_l^*)
\]

and

\[
y'_H (e_h^*) = c'_H (e_h^*) .
\]

With incomplete information, there are again many equilibria, some separating, some pooling and some semi-separating. But applying a stronger form of the Intuitive Criterion reasoning, we will pick the Riley equilibrium of this game, which is a particular separating equilibrium. It is characterized as follows. We first find the most preferred education level for the low type in the perfect information case, which coincides with the first best \(e_l^*\) determined in (2.3). Then we can write the
incentive compatibility constraint for the low type, such that when the market expects low types to obtain education $e_l^*$, the low type does not try to mimic the high type; in other words, the low type agent should not prefer to choose the education level the market expects from the high type, $e$, and receive the wage associated with this level of education. This incentive compatibility constraint is straightforward to write once we note that in the wage level that low type workers will obtain is exactly $y_L(e_l^*)$ in this case, since we are looking at the separating equilibrium. Thus the incentive compatibility constraint is simply

$$y_L(e_l^*) - c_L(e_l^*) \geq w(e) - c_L(e) \text{ for all } e,$$

where $w(e)$ is the wage rate paid for a worker with education $e$. Since $e_l^*$ is the first-best effort level for the low type worker, if we had $w(e) = y_L(e)$, this constraint would always be satisfied. However, since the market can not tell low and high type workers apart, by choosing a different level of education, a low type worker may be able to “mimic” and high type worker and thus we will typically have $w(e) \geq y_L(e)$ when $e \geq e_l^*$, with a strict inequality for some values of education. Therefore, the separating (Riley) equilibrium must satisfy (2.5) for the equilibrium wage function $w(e)$.

To make further progress, note that in a separating equilibrium, there will exist some level of education, say $e_h$, that will be chosen by high type workers. Then, Bertrand competition among firms, with the reasoning similar to that in the previous section, implies that $w(e_h) = y_H(e_h)$. Therefore, if a low type worker deviates to this level of effort, the market will take him to be a high type worker and pay him the wage $y_H(e_h)$. Now take this education level $e_h$ to be such that the incentive compatibility constraint, (2.5), holds as an equality, that is,

$$y_L(e_l^*) - c_L(e_l^*) = y_H(e_h) - c_L(e_h).$$

Then the Riley equilibrium is such that low types choose $e_l^*$ and obtain the wage $w(e_l^*) = y_L(e_l^*)$, and high types choose $e_h$ and obtain the wage $w(e_h) = y_H(e_h)$. That high types are happy to do this follows immediately from the single-crossing
Figure 2.3. The Riley equilibrium.

property, since

\[ y_H (e_h) - c_H (e_h) = y_H (e_h) - c_L (e_h) - (c_H (e_h) - c_L (e_h)) \]
\[ > y_H (e_h) - c_L (e_h) - (c_H (e^*_i) - c_L (e^*_i)) \]
\[ = y_L (e^*_i) - c_L (e^*_i) - (c_H (e^*_i) - c_L (e^*_i)) \]
\[ = y_L (e^*_i) - c_H (e^*_i), \]
where the first line is introduced by adding and subtracting $c_L(e_h)$. The second line follows from single crossing, since $c_H(e_h) - c_L(e_h) < c_H(e^*_h) - c_L(e^*_h)$ in view of the fact that $e^*_h < e_h$. The third line exploits (2.6), and the final line simply cancels the two $c_L(e^*_h)$ terms from the right hand side.

Figure 2.3 depicts this equilibrium diagrammatically (for clarity it assumes that $y_H(e)$ and $y_L(e)$ are linear in $e$).

Notice that in this equilibrium, high type workers invest more than they would have done in the perfect information case, in the sense that $e_h$ characterized here is greater than the education level that high type individuals chosen with perfect information, given by $e^*_h$ in (2.4).

3. Evidence on Labor Market Signaling

Is the signaling role of education important? There are a number of different ways of approaching this question. Unfortunately, direct evidence is difficult to find since ability differences across workers are not only unobserved by firms, but also by econometricians. Nevertheless, number of different strategies can be used to gauge the importance of signaling in the labor market. Here we will discuss a number of different attempts that investigate the importance of labor market signaling. In the next section, we will discuss empirical work that may give a sense of how important signaling considerations are in the aggregate.

Before this discussion, note the parallel between the selection stories discussed above and the signaling story. In both cases, the observed earnings differences between high and low education workers will include a component due to the fact that the abilities of the high and low education groups differ. There is one important difference, however, in that in the selection stories, the market observed ability, it was only us, the economists or the econometricians, who were unable to do so. In the signaling story, the market is also unable to observed ability, and is inferring it from education. For this reason, proper evidence in favor of the signaling story should go beyond documenting the importance of some type of “selection”.

44
There are four different approaches to determining whether signaling is important. The first line of work looks at whether degrees matter, in particular, whether a high school degree or the fourth year of college that gets an individual a university degree matter more than other years of schooling (e.g., Kane and Rouse). This approach suffers from two serious problems. First, the final year of college (or high school) may in fact be more useful than the third-year, especially because it shows that the individual is being able to learn all the required information that makes up a college degree. Second, and more serious, there is no way of distinguishing selection and signaling as possible explanations for these patterns. It may be that those who drop out of high school are observationally different to employers, and hence receive different wages, but these differences are not observed by us in the standard data sets. This is a common problem that will come back again: the implications of unobserved heterogeneity and signaling are often similar.

Second, a creative paper by Lang and Kropp tests for signaling by looking at whether compulsory schooling laws affect schooling above the regulated age. The reasoning is that if the 11th year of schooling is a signal, and the government legislates that everybody has to have 11 years of schooling, now high ability individuals have to get 12 years of schooling to distinguish themselves. They find evidence for this, which they interpret as supportive of the signaling model. The problem is that there are other reasons for why compulsory schooling laws may have such effects. For example, an individual who does not drop out of 11th grade may then decide to complete high school. Alternatively, there can be peer group effects in that as fewer people drop out of school, it may become less socially acceptable the drop out even at later grades.

The third approach is the best. It is pursued in a very creative paper by Tyler, Murnane and Willett. They observe that passing grades in the Graduate Equivalent Degree (GED) differ by state. So an individual with the same grade in the GED exam will get a GED in one state, but not in another. If the score in the exam is an unbiased measure of human capital, and there is no signaling, these two individuals
should get the same wages. In contrast, if the GED is a signal, and employers do not know where the individual took the GED exam, these two individuals should get different wages.

Using this methodology, the authors estimate that there is a 10-19 percent return to a GED signal. The attached table shows the results.

An interesting result that Tyler, Murnane and Willett find is that there are no GED returns to minorities. This is also consistent with the signaling view, since it turns out that many minorities prepare for and take the GED exam in prison. Therefore, GED would not only be a positive signal about ability, but also potentially a signal that the individual was at some point incarcerated. This latter feature makes a GED less of that positive signal for minorities.
CHAPTER 3

Externalities and Peer Effects

Many economists believe that human capital not only creates private returns, increasing the earnings of the individual who acquires it, but it also creates externalities, i.e., it increases the productivity of other agents in the economy (e.g., Jacobs, Lucas). If so, existing research on the private returns to education is only part of the picture—the social return, i.e., the private return plus the external return, may far exceed the private return. Conversely, if signaling is important, the private return overestimates the social return to schooling. Estimating the external and the social returns to schooling is a first-order question.

1. Theory

To show how and why external returns to education may arise, we will briefly discuss two models. The first is a theory of non-pecuniary external returns, meaning that external returns arise from technological linkages across agents or firms. The second is pecuniary model of external returns, thus externalities will arise from market interactions and changes in market prices resulting from the average education level of the workers.

1.1. Non-pecuniary human capital externalities. Suppose that the output (or marginal product) of a worker, \( i \), is

\[ y_i = Ah_i^{\nu}, \]

where \( h_i \) is the human capital (schooling) of the worker, and \( A \) is aggregate productivity. Assume that labor markets are competitive. So individual earnings are \( W_i = Ah_i^{\nu} \).
The key idea of externalities is that the exchange of ideas among workers raises productivity. This can be modeled by allowing $A$ to depend on aggregate human capital. In particular, suppose that

$A = BH^\delta \equiv \mathbb{E} [h_i]^{\delta}$, \hfill (3.1)

where $H$ is a measure of aggregate human capital, $\mathbb{E}$ is the expectation operator, $B$ is a constant.

Individual earnings can then be written as $W_i = Ah_i^{\nu} = BH^\delta h_i^{\nu}$. Therefore, taking logs, we have:

$\ln W_i = \ln B + \delta \ln H + \nu \ln h_i$. \hfill (3.2)

If external effects are stronger within a geographical area, as seems likely in a world where human interaction and the exchange of ideas are the main forces behind the externalities, then equation (3.2) should be estimated using measures of $H$ at the local level. This is a theory of non-pecuniary externalities, since the external returns arise from the technological nature of equation (3.1).

1.2. Pecuniary human capital externalities. The alternative is pecuniary externalities, as first conjectured by Alfred Marshall in his *Principles of Economics*, increasing the geographic concentration of specialized inputs may increase productivity since the matching between factor inputs and industries is improved. A similar story is developed in Acemoglu (1997), where firms find it profitable to invest in new technologies only when there is a sufficient supply of trained workers to replace employees who quit. We refer to this sort of effect as a pecuniary externality since greater human capital encourages more investment by firms and raises other workers’ wages via this channel.

Here, we will briefly explain a simplified version of the model in Acemoglu (1996).

Consider an economy lasting two periods, with production only in the second period, and a continuum of workers normalized to 1. Take human capital, $h_i$, as given. There is also a continuum of risk-neutral firms. In period 1, firms make an irreversible investment decision, $k$, at cost $Rk$. Workers and firms come together in
the second period. The labor market is not competitive; instead, firms and workers are matched randomly, and each firm meets a worker. The only decision workers and firms make after matching is whether to produce together or not to produce at all (since there are no further periods). If firm \( f \) and worker \( i \) produce together, their output is

\[
(3.3) \quad k_f^\alpha h_i^\nu,
\]

where \( \alpha < 1, \nu \leq 1 - \alpha \). Since it is costly for the worker-firm pair to separate and find new partners in this economy, employment relationships generate quasi-rents. Wages will therefore be determined by rent-sharing. Here, simply assume that the worker receives a share \( \beta \) of this output as a result of bargaining, while the firm receives the remaining \( 1 - \beta \) share.

An equilibrium in this economy is a set of schooling choices for workers and a set of physical capital investments for firms. Firm \( f \) maximizes the following expected profit function:

\[
(3.4) \quad (1 - \beta)k_f^\alpha \mathbb{E}[h_i^\nu] - Rk_f,
\]

with respect to \( k_f \). Since firms do not know which worker they will be matched with, their expected profit is an average of profits from different skill levels. The function (3.4) is strictly concave, so all firms choose the same level of capital investment, \( k_f = k \), given by

\[
(3.5) \quad k = \left( \frac{(1 - \beta)\alpha H}{R} \right)^{1/(1-\alpha)},
\]

where

\[
H \equiv \mathbb{E}[h_i^\nu]
\]

is the measure of aggregate human capital. Substituting (3.5) into (3.3), and using the fact that wages are equal to a fraction \( \beta \) of output, the wage income of individual \( i \) is given by

\[
W_i = \beta ((1 - \beta)\alpha H)^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} R^{-\alpha/(1-\alpha)} (h_i)^\nu.
\]

Taking logs, this is:

\[
(3.6) \quad \ln W_i = c + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \ln H + \nu \ln h_i,
\]

where \( c \) is a constant and \( \alpha / (1 - \alpha) \) and \( \nu \) are positive coefficients.
Human capital externalities arise here because firms choose their physical capital in anticipation of the average human capital of the workers they will employ in the future. Since physical and human capital are complements in this setup, a more educated labor force encourages greater investment in physical capital and to higher wages. In the absence of the need for search and matching, firms would immediately hire workers with skills appropriate to their investments, and there would be no human capital externalities.

Nonpecuniary and pecuniary theories of human capital externalities lead to similar empirical relationships since equation (3.6) is identical to equation (3.2), with \( c = \ln B \) and \( \delta = \alpha / (1 - \alpha) \). Again presuming that these interactions exist in local labor markets, we can estimate a version of (3.2) using differences in schooling across labor markets (cities, states, or even countries).

1.3. Signaling and negative externalities. The above models focused on positive externalities to education. However, in a world where education plays a signaling role, we might also expect significant negative externalities. To see this, consider the most extreme world in which education is only a signal—it does not have any productive role.

Contrast two situations: in the first, all individuals have 12 years of schooling and in the second all individuals have 16 years of schooling. Since education has no productive role, and all individuals have the same level of schooling, in both allocations they will earn exactly the same wage (equal to average productivity). Therefore, here the increase in aggregate schooling does not translate into aggregate increases in wages. But in the same world, if one individual obtains more education than the rest, there will be a private return to him, because he would signal that he is of higher ability. Therefore, in a world where signaling is important, we might also want to estimate an equation of the form (3.2), but when signaling issues are important, we would expect \( \delta \) to be negative.

The basic idea here is that in this world, what determines an individual’s wages is his “ranking” in the signaling distribution. When others invest more in their
education, a given individual’s rank in the distribution declines, hence others are creating a negative externality on this individual via their human capital investment.

2. Evidence

Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation of equations like (3.2) using city or state-level data yield very significant and positive estimates of $\delta$, indicating substantial positive human capital externalities. The leading example is the paper by Jim Rauch.

There are at least two problems with this type OLS estimates. First, it may be precisely high-wage cities or states that either attract a large number of high education workers or give strong support to education. Rauch’s estimates were using a cross-section of cities. Including city or state fixed affects ameliorates this problem, but does not solve it, since states’ attitudes towards education and the demand for labor may comove. The ideal approach would be to find a source of quasi-exogenous variation in average schooling across labor markets (variation unlikely to be correlated with other sources of variation in the demand for labor in the state).

Acemoglu and Angrist try to accomplish this using differences in compulsory schooling laws. The advantage is that these laws not only affect individual schooling but average schooling in a given area.

There is an additional econometric problem in estimating externalities, which remains even if we have an instrument for average schooling in the aggregate. This is that if individual schooling is measured with error (or for some other reason OLS returns to individual schooling are not the causal effect), some of this discrepancy between the OLS returns and the causal return may load on average schooling, even when average schooling is instrumented. This suggests that we may need to instrument for individual schooling as well (so as to get to the correct return to individual schooling).

More explicitly, let $Y_{ijt}$ be the log weekly wage, than the estimating equation is

\begin{equation}
Y_{ijt} = X_{ijt}'\mu + \delta_j + \delta_t + \gamma_1 S_{jt} + \gamma_2 s_i + u_{ijt} + \varepsilon_i,
\end{equation}
Lectures in Labor Economics

To illustrate the main issues, ignore time dependence, and consider the population regression of \( Y_i \) on \( s_i \):

\[
(3.8) \quad Y_{ij} = \mu_0 + \rho_0 s_i + \varepsilon_{0i}; \quad \text{where } E[\varepsilon_{0i}s_i] \equiv 0.
\]

Next consider the IV population regression using a full set of state dummies. This is equivalent to

\[
(3.9) \quad Y_{ij} = \mu_1 + \rho_1 S_j + \varepsilon_{1i}; \quad \text{where } E[\varepsilon_{1i}S_j] \equiv 0,
\]

since the projection of individual schooling on a set of state dummies is simply average schooling in each state.

Now consider the estimation of the empirical analogue of equation (3.2):

\[
(3.10) \quad Y_{ij} = \mu^* + \pi_0 s_i + \pi_1 S_j + \xi_i; \quad \text{where } E[\xi_iS_j] = E[\xi_iS_j] \equiv 0.
\]

Then, we have

\[
(3.11) \quad \pi_0 = \rho_1 + \phi (\rho_0 - \rho_1) \quad \pi_1 = \phi (\rho_1 - \rho_0)
\]

where \( \phi = 1/1 - R^2 > 1 \), and \( R^2 \) is the first-stage R-squared for the 2SLS estimates in (3.9). Therefore, when \( \rho_1 > \rho_0 \), for example because there is measurement error in individual schooling, we may find positive external returns even when there are none.

If we could instrument for both individual and average schooling, we would solve this problem. But what type of instrument?

Consider the relationship of interest:

\[
(3.12) \quad Y_{ij} = \mu + \gamma_1 S_j + \gamma_2 s_i + u_j + \varepsilon_i,
\]

which could be estimated by OLS or instrumental variables, to obtain an estimate of \( \gamma_1 \) as well as an average estimate of \( \gamma_2 \), say \( \gamma_2^* \).
An alternative way of expressing this relationship is to adjust for the effect of individual schooling by directly rewriting (3.12):

\[(3.13) \quad Y_{ij} - \gamma_2^* s_i \equiv \tilde{Y}_{ij} = \mu + \gamma_1 S_j + [u_j + \varepsilon_i + (\gamma_2 - \gamma_2^*)s_i].\]

In this case, instrumental variables estimate of external returns is equivalent to the Wald formula

\[\gamma_{IV} = \frac{E[\tilde{Y}_{ij}|z_i = 1] - E[\tilde{Y}_{ij}|z_i = 0]}{E[S_j|z_i = 1] - E[S_j|z_i = 0]} = \gamma_1 + \left(\frac{E[\gamma_2 s_i|z_i = 1] - E[\gamma_2 s_i|z_i = 0]}{E[s_i|z_i = 1] - E[s_i|z_i = 0]} \right) \cdot \left(\frac{E[s_i|z_i = 1] - E[s_i|z_i = 0]}{E[S_j|z_i = 1] - E[S_j|z_i = 0]} \right) \cdot (\gamma_2^*).
\]

This shows that we should set

\[(3.14) \quad \gamma_2^* = \frac{E[\gamma_2 s_i|z_i = 1] - E[\gamma_2 s_i|z_i = 0]}{E[s_i|z_i = 1] - E[s_i|z_i = 0]} = \frac{E[(Y_{ij} - \gamma_1 S_j)|z_i = 1] - E[(Y_{ij} - \gamma_1 S_j)|z_i = 0]}{E[s_i|z_i = 1] - E[s_i|z_i = 0]}.
\]

This is typically not the OLS estimator of the private return, and we should be using some instrument to simultaneously estimate the private return to schooling. The ideal instrument would be one affecting exactly the same people as the compulsory schooling laws.

Quarter of birth instruments might come close to this. Since quarter of birth instruments are likely to affect the same people as compulsory schooling laws, adjusting with the quarter of birth estimate, or using quarter of birth dummies as instrument for individual schooling, is the right strategy.

So the strategy is to estimate an equation similar to (3.2) or (3.10) using compulsory schooling laws for average schooling and quarter of birth dummies for individual schooling.

The estimation results from using this strategy in Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) suggest that there are no significant external returns. The estimates are typically around 1 or 2 percent, and statistically not different from zero. They also suggest
that in the aggregate signaling considerations are unlikely to be very important (at
the very least, they do not dominate positive externalities).

3. School Quality

Differences in school quality could be a crucial factor in differences in human
capital. Two individuals with the same years of schooling might have very different
skills and very different earnings because one went to a much better school, with
better teachers, instruction and resources. Differences in school quality would add
to the unobserved component of human capital.

A natural conjecture is that school quality as measured by teacher-pupil ratios,
spending per-pupil, length of school year, and educational qualifications of teachers
would be a major determinant of human capital. If school quality matters indeed a
lot, an effective way of increasing human capital might be to increase the quality of
instruction in schools.

This view was however challenged by a number of economists, most notably,
Hanushek. Hanushek noted that the substantial increase in spending per student
and teacher-pupil ratios, as well as the increase in the qualifications of teachers,
was not associated with improved student outcomes, but on the contrary with a
deterioration in many measures of high school students’ performance. In addition,
Hanushek conducted a meta-analysis of the large number of papers in the education
literature, and concluded that there was no overwhelming case for a strong effect of
resources and class size on student outcomes.

Although this research has received substantial attention, a number of careful
papers show that exogenous variation in class size and other resources are in fact
associated with sizable improvements in student outcomes.

Most notable:

(1) Krueger analyzes the data from the Tennessee Star experiment where stu-
dents were randomly allocated to classes of different sizes.
(2) Angrist and Lavy analyze the effect of class size on test scores using a unique characteristic of Israeli schools which caps class size at 40, thus creating a natural regression discontinuity as a function of the total number of students in the school.

(3) Card and Krueger look at the effects of pupil-teacher ratio, term length and relative teacher wage by comparing the earnings of individuals working in the same state but educated in different states with different school resources.

(4) Another paper by Card and Krueger looks at the effect of the “exogenously” forced narrowing of the resource gap between black and white schools in South Carolina on the gap between black and white pupils’ education and subsequent earnings.

All of these papers find sizable effects of school quality on student outcomes. Moreover, a recent paper by Krueger shows that there were many questionable decisions in the meta-analysis by Hanushek, shedding doubt on the usefulness of this analysis. On the basis of these various pieces of evidence, it is safe to conclude that school quality appears to matter for human capital.

4. Peer Group Effects

Issues of school quality are also intimately linked to those of externalities. An important type of externality, different from the external returns to education discussed above, arises in the context of education is peer group effects, or generally social effects in the process of education. The fact that children growing up in different areas may choose different role models will lead to this type of externalities/peer group effects. More simply, to the extent that schooling and learning are group activities, there could be this type of peer group effects.

There are a number of theoretical issues that need to be clarified, as well as important work that needs to be done in understanding where peer group effects are coming from. Moreover, empirical investigation of peer group effects is at its
infancy, and there are very difficult issues involved in estimation and interpretation. Since there is little research in understanding the nature of peer group effects, here we will simply take peer group effects as given, and briefly discuss some of its efficiency implications, especially for community structure and school quality, and then very briefly mention some work on estimating peer group affects.

4.1. Implications of peer group effects for mixing and segregation. An important question is whether the presence of peer group effects has any particular implications for the organization of schools, and in particular, whether children who provide positive externalities on other children should be put together in a separate school or classroom.

The basic issue here is equivalent to an assignment problem. The general principle in assignment problems, such as Becker’s famous model of marriage, is that if inputs from the two parties are complementary, there should be assortative matching, that is the highest quality individuals should be matched together. In the context of schooling, this implies that children with better characteristics, who are likely to create more positive externalities and be better role models, should be segregated in their own schools, and children with worse characteristics, who will tend to create negative externalities will, should go to separate schools. This practically means segregation along income lines, since often children with “better characteristics” are those from better parental backgrounds, while children with worse characteristics are often from lower socioeconomic backgrounds.

So much is well-known and well understood. The problem is that there is an important confusion in the literature, which involves deducing complementarity from the fact that in equilibrium we do observe segregation (e.g., rich parents sending their children to private schools with other children from rich parents, or living in suburbs and sending their children to suburban schools, while poor parents live in ghettos and children from disadvantaged backgrounds go to school with other disadvantaged children in inner cities). This reasoning is often used in discussions of Tiebout competition, together with the argument that allowing parents with
different characteristics/tastes to sort into different neighborhoods will often be efficient.

The underlying idea can be given by the following simple model. Suppose that schools consist of two kids, and denote the parental background (e.g., home education or parental expenditure on non-school inputs) of kids by $e$, and the resulting human capitals by $h$. Suppose that we have

\begin{align}
    h_1 &= e_1^\alpha e_2^{1-\alpha} \\
    h_2 &= e_1^{1-\alpha} e_2^\alpha
\end{align}

where $\alpha > 1/2$. This implies that parental backgrounds are complementary, and each kid’s human capital will depend mostly on his own parent’s background, but also on that of the other kid in the school. For example, it may be easier to learn or be motivated when other children in the class are also motivated. This explains why we have $\partial h_1 / \partial e_2 > 0$ and $\partial h_2 / \partial e_1 > 0$. But an equally important feature of (3.15) is that $\partial^2 h_1 / \partial e_2 \partial e_1 > 0$ and $\partial^2 h_2 / \partial e_1 \partial e_2 > 0$, that is, the backgrounds of the two kids are complementary. This implies that a classmate with a good background is especially useful to another kid with a good background. We can think of this as the “bad apple” theory of classroom: one bad kid in the classroom brings down everybody.

As a digression, notice an important feature of the way we wrote (3.15) linking the outcome variables, $h_1$ and $h_2$, to predetermined characteristics of children $e_1$ and $e_2$, which creates a direct analogy with the human capital externalities discussed above. However, this may simply be the reduced form of that somewhat different model, for example,

\begin{align}
    h_1 &= H_1 (e_1, h_2) \\
    h_2 &= H_2 (e_2, h_1)
\end{align}

whereby each individual’s human capital depends on his own background and the human capital choice of the other individual. Although in reduced form (3.15) and
(3.16) are very similar, they provide different interpretations of peer group effects, and econometrically they pose different challenges, which we will discuss below.

The complementarity has two implications:

(1) It is socially efficient, in the sense of maximizing the sum of human capitals, to have parents with good backgrounds to send their children to school with other parents with good backgrounds. This follows simply from the definition of complementarity, positive cross-partial derivative, which is clearly verified by the production functions in (3.15).

(2) It will also be an equilibrium outcome that parents will do so. To see this, suppose that we have a situation in which there are two sets of parents with background $e_l$ and $e_h > e_l$. Suppose that there is mixing. Now the marginal willingness to pay of a parent with the high background to be in the same school with the child of another high-background parent, rather than a low-background student, is

$$e_h - e^\alpha_h e^{1-\alpha}_l,$$

while the marginal willingness to pay of a low background parent to stay in the school with the high background parents is

$$e^\alpha_l e^{1-\alpha}_h - e_l.$$

The complementarity between $e_h$ and $e_l$ in (3.15) implies that $e_h - e^\alpha_h e^{1-\alpha}_l > e^\alpha_l e^{1-\alpha}_h - e_l$.

Therefore, the high-background parent can always outbid the low-background parent for the privilege of sending his children to school with other high-background parents. Thus with profit maximizing schools, segregation will arise as the outcome.

Next consider a production function with substitutability (negative cross-partial derivative). For example,

$$h_1 = \phi e_1 + e_2 - \lambda e^{1/2}_1 e^{1/2}_2$$

$$h_2 = e_1 + \phi e_2 - \lambda e^{1/2}_1 e^{1/2}_2$$

58
where $\phi > 1$ and $\lambda > 0$ but small, so that human capital is increasing in parental background. With this production function, we again have $\partial h_1 / \partial e_2 > 0$ and $\partial h_2 / \partial e_1 > 0$, but now in contrast to (3.15), we now have

$$\frac{\partial^2 h_1}{\partial e_2 \partial e_1} \text{ and } \frac{\partial^2 h_2}{\partial e_1 \partial e_2} < 0.$$  

This can be thought as corresponding to the “good apple” theory of the classroom, where the kids with the best characteristics and attitudes bring the rest of the class up.

In this case, because the cross-partial derivative is negative, the marginal willingness to pay of low-background parents to have their kid together with high-background parents is higher than that of high-background parents. With perfect markets, we will observe mixing, and in equilibrium schools will consist of a mixture of children from high- and low-background parents.

Now combining the outcomes of these two models, many people jump to the conclusion that since we do observe segregation of schooling in practice, parental backgrounds must be complementary, so segregation is in fact efficient. Again the conclusion is that allowing Tiebout competition and parental sorting will most likely achieve efficient outcomes.

However, this conclusion is not correct, since even if the correct production function was (3.17), segregation would arise in the presence of credit market problems. In particular, the way that mixing is supposed to occur with (3.17) is that low-background parents make a payment to high-background parents so that the latter send their children to a mixed school. To see why such payments are necessary, recall that even with (3.17) we have that the first derivatives are positive, that is

$$\frac{\partial h_1}{\partial e_2} > 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial h_2}{\partial e_1} > 0.$$  

This means that everything else being equal all children benefit from being in the same class with other children with good backgrounds. With (3.17), however, children from better backgrounds benefit less than children from less good backgrounds.
This implies that there has to be payments from parents of less good backgrounds to high-background parents.

Such payments are both difficult to implement in practice, and practically impossible taking into account the credit market problems facing parents from poor socioeconomic status.

This implies that, if the true production function is (3.17) but there are credit market problems, we will observe segregation in equilibrium, and the segregation will be inefficient. Therefore we cannot simply appeal to Tiebout competition, or deduce efficiency from the equilibrium patterns of sorting.

Another implication of this analysis is that in the absence of credit market problems (and with complete markets), cross-partials determine the allocation of students to schools. With credit market problems, first there of it has become important. This is a general result, with a range of implications for empirical work.

4.2. The Benabou model. A similar point is developed by Benabou even in the absence of credit market problems, but relying on other missing markets. His model has competitive labor markets, and local externalities (externalities in schooling in the local area). All agents are assumed to be ex ante homogeneous, and will ultimately end up either low skill or high skill.

Utility of agent $i$ is assumed to be

$$U^i = w^i - c^i - r^i$$

where $w$ is the wage, $c$ is the cost of education, which is necessary to become both low skill or high skill, and $r$ is rent.

The cost of education is assumed to depend on the fraction of the agents in the neighborhood, denoted by $x$, who become high skill. In particular, we have $c_H(x)$ and $c_L(x)$ as the costs of becoming high skill and low skill. Both costs are decreasing in $x$, meaning that when there are more individuals acquiring high skill, becoming high skill is cheaper (positive peer group effects). In addition, we have

$$c_H(x) > c_L(x)$$
so that becoming high skill is always more expensive, and as shown in Figure 3.1

\[ c'_H(x) < c'_L(x), \]

so that the effect of increase in the fraction of high skill individuals in the neighborhood is bigger on the cost of becoming high skill.

Since all agents are ex ante identical, in equilibrium we must have

\[ U(L) = U(H) \]

that is, the utility of becoming high skill and low skill must be the same.

Assume that the labor market in the economy is global, and takes the constant returns to scale form \( F(H, L) \). The important implication here is that irrespective of where the worker obtains his education, he will receive the same wage as a function of his skill level.

Also assume that there are two neighborhoods of fixed size, and individuals will compete in the housing market to locate in one neighborhood or the other.

As shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, there can be two types of equilibria:
Figure 3.2. Integrated City Equilibrium

(1) Integrated city equilibrium, where in both neighborhoods there is a fraction $\hat{x}$ of individuals obtaining high education.

(2) Segregated city equilibrium, where one of the neighborhoods is homogeneous. For example, we could have a situation where one neighborhood has $x = 1$ and the other has $\hat{x} < 1$, or one neighborhood has $x = 0$ and the other has $\check{x} > 0$.

The important observation here is that only segregated city equilibria are “stable”. To see this consider an integrated city equilibrium, and imagine relocating a fraction $\varepsilon$ of the high-skill individuals (that is individuals getting high skills) from neighborhood 1 to neighborhood 2. This will reduce the cost of education in neighborhood 2, both for high and low skill individuals. But by assumption, it reduces it more for high skill individuals, so all high skill individuals now will pay higher rents to be in that city, and they will outbid low-skill individuals, taking the economy toward the segregated city equilibrium.
In contrast, the segregated city equilibrium is always stable. So we again have a situation in which segregation arises as the equilibrium outcome, and this is again because of a reasoning relying on the notion of “complementarity”. As in the previous section, high-skill individuals can outbid the low-skill individuals because they benefit more from the peer group effects of high skill individuals.

But crucially there are again missing markets in this economy. In particular, rather than paying high skill individuals for the positive externalities that they create, as would be the case in complete markets, agents transact simply through the housing market. In the housing market, there is only one rent level, which both high and low skill individuals pay. In contrast, with complete markets, we can think of the pricing scheme for housing to be such that high skill individuals pay a lower rent (to be compensated for the positive externality that they are creating on the other individuals).

Therefore, there are missing markets, and efficiency is not guaranteed. Is the allocation with segregation efficient?
It turns out that it may or may not. To see this consider the problem of a utilitarian social planner maximizing total output minus costs of education for workers. This implies that the social planner will maximize

\[ F(H, L) - H_1 c_H(x_1) - H_2 c_H(x_2) - L_1 c_L(x_1) - L_2 c_L(x_2) \]

where

\[ x_1 = \frac{H_1}{L_1 + H_1} \quad \text{and} \quad x_2 = \frac{H_2}{L_2 + H_2} \]

This problem can be broken into two parts: first, the planner will choose the aggregate amount of skilled individuals, and then she will choose how to actually allocate them between the two neighborhoods. The second part is simply one of cost minimization, and the solution depends on whether \( \Phi(x) = x c_H(x) + (1 - x) c_L(x) \) is concave or convex. This function is simply the cost of giving high skills to a fraction \( x \) of the population. When it is convex, it means that it is best to choose the same level of \( x \) in both neighborhoods, and when it is concave, the social planner minimizes costs by choosing two extreme values of \( x \) in the two neighborhoods.

It turns out that this function can be convex, i.e. \( \Phi''(x) > 0 \). More specifically, we have:

\[ \Phi''(x) = 2(c_H'(x) - c_L'(x)) + x(c''_H(x) - c''_L(x)) + c''_L(x) \]

We can have \( \Phi''(x) > 0 \) when the second and third terms are large. Intuitively, this can happen because although a high skill individual benefits more from being together with other high skill individuals, he is also creating a positive externality on low skill individuals when he mixes with them. This externality is not internalized, potentially leading to inefficiency.

This model gives another example of why equilibrium segregation does not imply efficient segregation.

4.3. Empirical issues and evidence. Peer group effects are generally difficult to identify. In addition, we can think of two alternative formulations where one is practically impossible to identify satisfactorily. To discuss these issues, let us go back
to the previous discussion, and recall that the two “structural” formulations, (3.15) and (3.16), have very similar reduced forms, but the peer group effects work quite differently, and have different interpretations. In (3.15), it is the (predetermined) characteristics of my peers that determine my outcomes, whereas in (3.16), it is the outcomes of my peers that matter. Above we saw how to identify externalities in human capital, which is in essence similar to the structural form in (3.15). More explicitly, the equation of interest is

\[(3.18)\quad y_{ij} = \theta x_{ij} + \alpha \bar{X}_j + \varepsilon_{ij}\]

where $\bar{X}$ is average characteristic (e.g., average schooling) and $y_{ij}$ is the outcome of the $i$th individual in group $j$. Here, for identification all we need is exogenous variation in $\bar{X}$.

The alternative is

\[(3.19)\quad y_{ij} = \theta x_{ij} + \alpha \bar{Y}_j + \varepsilon_{ij}\]

where $\bar{Y}$ is the average of the outcomes. Some reflection will reveal why the parameter $\alpha$ is now practically impossible to identify. Since $\bar{Y}_j$ does not vary by individual, this regression amounts to one of $\bar{Y}_j$ on itself at the group level. This is a serious econometric problem. One imperfect way to solve this problem is to replace $\bar{Y}_j$ on the right hand side by $\bar{Y}_j^{-i}$ which is the average excluding individual $i$. Another approach is to impose some timing structure. For example:

\[y_{ijt} = \theta x_{ijt} + \alpha \bar{Y}_{j,t-1} + \varepsilon_{ijt}\]

There are still some serious problems irrespective of the approach taken. First, the timing structure is arbitrary, and second, there is no way of distinguishing peer group effects from “common shocks”.

As an example consider the paper by Sacerdote, which uses random assignment of roommates in Dartmouth. He finds that the GPAs of randomly assigned roommates are correlated, and interprets this as evidence for peer group effects. The next table summarizes some of the key results.
Despite the very nice nature of the experiment, the conclusion is problematic, because Sacerdote attempts to identify (3.19) rather than (3.18). For example, to the extent that there are common shocks to both roommates (e.g., they are in a noisier dorm), this may not reflect peer group effects. Instead, the problem would not have arisen if the right-hand side regressor was some predetermined characteristic of the
roommate (i.e., then we would be estimating something similar to (3.18) rather than (3.19)).