

# Solving Models with Heterogeneous Expectations

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# Overview

- ① Current approaches to model heterogeneous expectations
- ② Numerical algorithm to solve models with rational and irrational agents the right way

# Modelling heterogeneous expectations

- Agent-based modelling:
  - several papers have "fundamental" or "rational" agents but terminology is very misleading
  - lack of forward looking agents makes numerical analysis very straightforward (just simulate the economy)
- Rule of thumb and rational agents
  - popular in model with New Keynesian Phillips curve
  - But NK Phillips curve has been derived under assumption of homogeneous expectations

# Some papers do combine both elements

Nice examples in the literature:

- Nunes (*Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 2009)
  - rational agents and agents that learn
- Molnar (2010)
  - rational agents and backward looking agents
  - fractions of each endogenous

# Nunes (2009)

NK Phillips curve:

$$\pi_t = \kappa z_t + \beta \tilde{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$$

IS curve:

$$z_t = \tilde{E}_t z_{t+1} - \sigma^{-1} \left( r_t - r_t^n - \tilde{E}_t \pi_{t+1} \right)$$

# Nunes (2009)

Natural rate:

$$r_t^n = \rho r_{t-1}^n + \varepsilon_t$$

Policy:

$$r_t = \pi^* + \phi_\pi (\pi_t - \pi^*) + \phi_z z_t$$

# Nunes (2009)

## Nice:

- Rational agents are truly rational

## Not nice:

- Nunes follows the standard approach:
  - ① use a representative agent model
  - ② simply replace the expectation by a weighted average of agents expectations

But how do I know these are the right relationships if agents have heterogeneous expectations

# Molnar (2010)

Model:

$$\begin{aligned}p_t &= \lambda E_t [p_{t+1}] + m_t \\m_t &= \rho m_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t, \quad \rho \in [0, 1)\end{aligned}$$

Again,  $E_t [p_{t+1}]$  is a weighted average of the expectations of different types



# New Keynesian model and aggregation

NK Phillips curve:

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t [\pi_{t+1}] + \lambda y_t$$

- Question: Does this equation hold in models with heterogeneous agents with  $E_t [\pi_{t+1}]$  replaced by weighted average?
- Branch and McGough (2009):
  - there is a set of assumptions for which the answer is yes
  - assumptions are restrictive
  - even necessary conditions are shown to be restrictive

# Alternative setup

- Model behavior of *individual* agents from the ground up
  - some rational
  - some not rational
- Explicit aggregate their behavior to get aggregate behavior
- Can we solve these models? Yes
  - using the tools learned in this course

# Environment

- unit mass of firms
- half has rational expectations
- half has "type A" expectations
- for now fractions are fixed

# Firm output

All firms have the same production function

$$y_i = z_i (z_1 n_{1,-1}^\alpha + z_2 n_{2,-1}^\alpha)$$

- two production processes
- $n_1$  and  $n_2$  are chosen in previous period
- $z_i$  : idiosyncratic shock
- $z_1$  and  $z_2$  : aggregate (common) shocks

# Exogenous random processes

$$z_i = (1 - \rho_i) + \rho_i z_{i,-1} + e_i, \quad e_i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2)$$

$$z_1 = (1 - \rho) + \rho z_{1,-1} + e_1, \quad e_1 \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

$$z_2 = (1 - \rho) + \rho z_{2,-1} + e_2, \quad e_2 \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

# Problem rational agent

$$\begin{aligned}
 & v(n_{1,-1}, n_{2,-1}, z) \\
 & = \\
 \max_{n_1, n_2} & \left( z_i \left( z_1 n_{1,-1}^\alpha + z_2 n_{2,-1}^\alpha \right) - w(N_{-1}) - 0.5\eta(n - n_{-1})^2 \right) \\
 & \quad + \beta E_t [v(n_1, n_2, z_{+1})]
 \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
 n & = n_1 + n_2, \\
 N & : \text{ aggregate employment}
 \end{aligned}$$

# FOCs rational firm

$$\alpha\beta E[z_{i,+1}] E[z_{1,+1}] n_1^{\alpha-1} - \beta E[w_{+1}] \\ - \eta(n - n_{-1}) + \eta\beta E[n_{+1} - n] = 0$$

$$\alpha\beta E[z_{i,+1}] E[z_{2,+1}] n_2^{\alpha-1} - \beta E[w_{+1}] \\ - \eta(n - n_{-1}) + \eta\beta E[n_{+1} - n] = 0$$

## FOCs type A firm

$$\alpha\beta\widehat{E}[\hat{z}_{i,+1}]\widehat{E}[z_{1,+1}]\hat{n}_1^{\alpha-1} - \beta\widehat{E}[w_{+1}] - \eta(\hat{n} - \hat{n}_{-1}) + \eta\beta\widehat{E}[\hat{n}_{+1} - \hat{n}] = 0$$

$$\alpha\beta\widehat{E}[\hat{z}_{i,+1}]\widehat{E}[z_{2,+1}]\hat{n}_2^{\alpha-1} - \beta\widehat{E}[w_{+1}] - \eta(\hat{n} - \hat{n}_{-1}) + \eta\beta\widehat{E}[\hat{n}_{+1} - \hat{n}] = 0$$



# Labor supply

$$w = \omega_0 + \omega_1 (N_{-1} - 1)$$

$$N = \frac{\int n_i di + \int \hat{n}_i di}{2}$$

# Normalization

$$\omega_0 = \alpha 0.5^{\alpha-1}$$

Steady state values:

$$n_1 = n_2 = \hat{n}_1 = \hat{n}_2 = 0.5$$

$$w = \omega_0$$

$$N = 1$$

# Solving the rational firm problem

- Rational firm's problem easy if I know ....

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- Rational firm's problem easy if I know ....
- dgp for wages (or  $N$ ) or conditional expectations

# Problem for type A

Just as easy or easier

# Solving the complete problem

- Use KS iteration scheme

# Solving the complete problem

- Use KS iteration scheme
- PEA

## Varying fractions of types

- state-dependent switching
- probability of switching depends on profitability
- E.g.

$$P_{AR} = \frac{1 - \rho_p}{2} + \rho_p P_{AR,-1} + \eta (F_R - F_A)$$

$$P_{RA} = \frac{1 - \rho_p}{2} + \rho_p P_{RA,-1} - \eta (F_R - F_A)$$

where

$F_R$  : average profits made by rational firms

$F_A$  : average profits made by type A firms



# Implications for algorithms?

- What are the implications for deriving ALM?
- What are the implications for individual firm problem?

# What is wrong?

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \alpha * n_{1\_R}^{(\alpha-1)} * z_i(+1) * z_1(+1) \\
 & = \\
 & \quad \text{wage\_exp\_R} \\
 & \quad + \text{eta} * (n\_R - n\_R(-1)) \\
 & \quad - (1 - \text{prob}) * \text{eta} * (n\_R(+1) - n\_R) \\
 & \quad - \text{prob} * \text{eta} * (n\_A(+1) - n\_R)
 \end{aligned}$$

# How to do it correctly with Dynare?

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \text{alpha} * \text{n\_1\_R}^{\text{alpha}-1} * \text{z\_i}(+1) * \text{z\_1}(+1) \\
 & \quad = \\
 & \quad \quad \text{wage\_exp\_R} \\
 & \quad \quad + \text{eta} * (\text{n\_R} - \text{n\_R}(-1)) \\
 & \quad \quad - (1 - \text{prob}) * \text{eta} * (\text{n\_R}(+1) - \text{n\_R}) \\
 & \quad \quad - \text{prob} \quad \quad \quad \text{eta} * (??? - \text{n\_R})
 \end{aligned}$$

# How to do it correctly with Dynare?

Suppose ??? in the previous slide is an *endogenous* rule that I have to solve for.

Can I solve for the policy rule of ??? and  $\pi_R$  with Dynare?

# How to do it correctly with Dynare?

Can I do this with *first-order* perturbation?

# Switching types and valuation problems

example above:

- rational firm does think through implications of choices for his irrational self
- But there is no "valuation" problem to assess value of irrational self
- Would that be problematic?

# Switching types and valuation problems

new example

- simpler environment
- different question, namely:
  - calculate firm value
  - while rationally taking into account that you could become irrational
  - fixed probability of switching

# Firm problem

$$\begin{aligned} v(n_{-1}, z) &= \max_n \left[ zn_{-1}^\alpha - wn_{-1} + 0.5\eta(n - n_{-1})^2 \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \begin{array}{c} (1 - \rho) v(n, z_{+1}) \\ \rho w(n, z_{+1}) \end{array} \right] \right] \\ &= \max_n \left[ zn_{-1}^\alpha - wn_{-1} + 0.5\eta(n^* - n_{-1})^2 \right. \\ &\quad \left. + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \begin{array}{c} (1 - \rho) v(n^*, z_{+1}) \\ \rho w(n^*, z_{+1}) \end{array} \right] \right] \end{aligned}$$



# Switching types and valuation problems

- $v(n_{-1}, z)$  : value of a rational firm according to rational agent
- $w(n_{-1}, z)$  : value of an irrational firm according to a rational agent, i.e. *using rational expectations*

# Rational value of irrational firm

$$w(n_{-1}, z) = zn_{-1}^{\alpha} - wn_{-1} + 0.5\eta(\hat{n} - n_{-1})^2 + \beta E_t \left[ \begin{array}{c} (1 - \rho) v(\hat{n}, z_{+1}) \\ \rho w(\hat{n}, z_{+1}) \end{array} \right]$$

So again a standard problem

# Idiosyncratic shocks

- Do I need them?

# Learning problem

- Go back to original problem
  - but no idiosyncratic shocks
- Type A firms forecast using "least-squares" learning
- They use past observations to fit forecasting rule for
- $\hat{E}[z_1]$ ,  $\hat{E}[z_2]$ ,  $\hat{E}[w_{+1}]$ ,  $\hat{E}[\hat{n}_{+1}]$

# Forecasting rules

Example of forecasting rules

$$\hat{E}[y] = \hat{\omega}_0 + \hat{\omega}_1 y_{-1}$$

and  $\hat{\omega}_0$  and  $\hat{\omega}_1$  estimated using past observations

# Weighted least-squares

$$y_t = bx_t + u_t$$

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{b}_T &= \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{T-t} x_t y_t}{\sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{T-t} x_t^2} \\ &= \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{T-t} x_t y_t}{K_T}\end{aligned}$$

# Recursive weighted least-squares

- For the problem to be tractable we need recursive formulation for the forecasts made by type A firms
  - like in the Kalman filter

# Recursive weighted least-squares

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{b}_{T+1} &= \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T+1} \beta^{T+1-t} x_t y_t}{K_{T+1}} \\ &= \frac{\beta \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{T-t} x_t y_t + x_{T+1} y_{T+1}}{K_{T+1}} \\ &= \frac{\beta K_T}{K_{T+1}} \hat{b}_T + \frac{x_{T+1} y_{T+1}}{K_{T+1}} \\ K_{T+1} &= \beta K_T + x_{T+1}^2\end{aligned}$$



# FOCs rational firm

$$\alpha\beta E[z_{i,+1}] E[z_{1,+1}] n_1^{\alpha-1} - \beta E[w_{+1}] \\ - \eta(n - n_{-1}) + \eta\beta E[n_{+1} - n] = 0$$

$$\alpha\beta E[z_{i,+1}] E[z_{2,+1}] n_2^{\alpha-1} - \beta E[w_{+1}] \\ - \eta(n - n_{-1}) + \eta\beta E[n_{+1} - n] = 0$$

# Algorithm

- Parameterize expectations
  - which one(s)?
- Simulate economy
- Update expectation

# State variables for rational agent

???

# Tough problem?

- This is a standard problem
- Many state variables?
  - possibly if type A agents forecast a lot of variables
  - but maybe you don't need all as state variables to get an accurate solution

# References

- Branch, W.A., and B.McGough, 2009, A New Keynesian Model with Heterogeneous Expectations, *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*.
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- Nunes, R., 2009, Learning the inflation target, *Macroeconomic Dynamics*.