

Solving Models with Heterogeneous Expectations

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Overview

- ① Current approaches to model heterogeneous expectations
- ② Numerical algorithm to solve models with rational and irrational agents the right way

Modelling heterogeneous expectations

- Agent-based modelling:
 - several papers have "fundamental" or "rational" agents but terminology is very misleading
 - lack of forward looking agents makes numerical analysis very straightforward (just simulate the economy)
- Rule of thumb and rational agents
 - popular in model with New Keynesian Phillips curve
 - But NK Phillips curve has been derived under assumption of homogeneous expectations

Some papers do combine both elements

Nice examples in the literature:

- Nunes (*Macroeconomic Dynamics*, 2009)
 - rational agents and agents that learn
- Molnar (2010)
 - rational agents and backward looking agents
 - fractions of each endogenous

Nunes (2009)

NK Phillips curve:

$$\pi_t = \kappa z_t + \beta \tilde{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$$

IS curve:

$$z_t = \tilde{E}_t z_{t+1} - \sigma^{-1} \left(r_t - r_t^n - \tilde{E}_t \pi_{t+1} \right)$$

Nunes (2009)

Natural rate:

$$r_t^n = \rho r_{t-1}^n + \varepsilon_t$$

Policy:

$$r_t = \pi^* + \phi_\pi (\pi_t - \pi^*) + \phi_z z_t$$

Nunes (2009)

Nice:

- Rational agents are truly rational

Not nice:

- Nunes follows the standard approach:
 - ① use a representative agent model
 - ② simply replace the expectation by a weighted average of agents expectations

But how do I know these are the right relationships if agents have heterogeneous expectations

Molnar (2010)

Model:

$$\begin{aligned} p_t &= \lambda \mathbb{E}_t [p_{t+1}] + m_t \\ m_t &= \rho m_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t, \quad \rho \in [0, 1) \end{aligned}$$

Again, $\mathbb{E}_t [p_{t+1}]$ is a weighted average of the expectations of different types

New Keynesian model and aggregation

NK Phillips curve:

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t [\pi_{t+1}] + \lambda y_t$$

- Question: Does this equation hold in models with heterogeneous agents with $E_t [\pi_{t+1}]$ replaced by weighted average?
- Branch and McGough (2009):
 - there is a set of assumptions for which the answer is yes
 - assumptions are restrictive
 - even necessary conditions are shown to be restrictive

Alternative setup

- Model behavior of *individual* agents from the ground up
 - some rational
 - some not rational
- Explicit aggregate their behavior to get aggregate behavior
- Can we solve these models? Yes
 - using the tools learned in this course

Environment

- unit mass of firms
- half has rational expectations
- half has "type A" expectations
- for now fractions are fixed

Firm output

All firms have the same production function

$$y_i = z_i (z_1 n_{1,-1}^\alpha + z_2 n_{2,-1}^\alpha)$$

- two production processes
- n_1 and n_2 are chosen in previous period
- z_i : idiosyncratic shock
- z_1 and z_2 : aggregate (common) shocks

Exogenous random processes

$$z_i = (1 - \rho_i) + \rho_i z_{i,-1} + e_i, \quad e_i \sim N(0, \sigma_i^2)$$

$$z_1 = (1 - \rho) + \rho z_{1,-1} + e_1, \quad e_1 \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

$$z_2 = (1 - \rho) + \rho z_{2,-1} + e_2, \quad e_2 \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$$

Problem rational agent

$$\begin{aligned}
 v(n_{1,-1}, n_{2,-1}, z) &= \\
 \max_{n_1, n_2} \left(& z_i \left(z_1 n_{1,-1}^\alpha + z_2 n_{2,-1}^\alpha \right) - w(N_{-1}) - 0.5\eta(n - n_{-1})^2 \right. \\
 & \left. + \beta E_t [v(n_1, n_2, z_{+1})] \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned}
 n &= n_1 + n_2, \\
 N &: \text{aggregate employment}
 \end{aligned}$$

FOCs rational firm

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha\beta\mathbb{E}[z_{i,+1}]\mathbb{E}[z_{1,+1}]n_1^{\alpha-1} - \beta\mathbb{E}[w_{+1}] \\ -\eta(n - n_{-1}) + \eta\beta\mathbb{E}[n_{+1} - n] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha\beta\mathbb{E}[z_{i,+1}]\mathbb{E}[z_{2,+1}]n_2^{\alpha-1} - \beta\mathbb{E}[w_{+1}] \\ -\eta(n - n_{-1}) + \eta\beta\mathbb{E}[n_{+1} - n] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

FOCs type A firm

$$\begin{aligned} & \alpha \beta \widehat{\mathbb{E}} [\hat{z}_{i,+1}] \widehat{\mathbb{E}} [z_{1,+1}] \hat{n}_1^{\alpha-1} - \beta \widehat{\mathbb{E}} [w_{+1}] \\ & - \eta (\hat{n} - \hat{n}_{-1}) + \eta \beta \widehat{\mathbb{E}} [\hat{n}_{+1} - \hat{n}] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \alpha \beta \widehat{\mathbb{E}} [\hat{z}_{i,+1}] \widehat{\mathbb{E}} [z_{2,+1}] \hat{n}_2^{\alpha-1} - \beta \widehat{\mathbb{E}} [w_{+1}] \\ & - \eta (\hat{n} - \hat{n}_{-1}) + \eta \beta \widehat{\mathbb{E}} [\hat{n}_{+1} - \hat{n}] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Labor supply

$$w = \omega_0 + \omega_1 (N_{-1} - 1)$$

$$N = \frac{\int n_i di + \int \hat{n}_i di}{2}$$

Normalization

$$\omega_0 = \alpha 0.5^{\alpha-1}$$

Steady state values:

$$n_1 = n_2 = \hat{n}_1 = \hat{n}_2 = 0.5$$

$$w = \omega_0$$

$$N = 1$$

Solving the rational firm problem

- Rational firm's problem easy if I know

Solving the rational firm problem

- Rational firm's problem easy if I know
- dgp for wages (or N) or conditional expectations

Problem for type A

Just as easy or easier

Solving the complete problem

- Use KS iteration scheme

Solving the complete problem

- Use KS iteration scheme
- PEA

Varying fractions of types

- state-dependent switching
- probability of switching depends on profitability
- E.g.

$$P_{AR} = \frac{1 - \rho_p}{2} + \rho_p P_{AR,-1} + \eta (F_R - F_A)$$

$$P_{RA} = \frac{1 - \rho_p}{2} + \rho_p P_{RA,-1} - \eta (F_R - F_A)$$

where

F_R : average profits made by rational firms

F_A : average profits made by type A firms

Implications for algorithms?

- What are the implications for deriving ALM?
- What are the implications for individual firm problem?

What is wrong?

$$\begin{aligned} \text{alpha} * n_{-1_R}^{\wedge}(\text{alpha}-1) * z_{-i}(+1) * z_{-1}(+1) \\ = \\ \text{wage_exp_R} \\ + \text{eta} * (n_{_R} - n_{_R}(-1)) \\ - (1 - \text{prob}) * \text{eta} * (n_{_R}(+1) - n_{_R}) \\ - \text{prob} * \text{eta} * (n_{_A}(+1) - n_{_R}) \end{aligned}$$

How to do it correctly with Dynare?

$$\begin{aligned} \text{alpha} * n_{-1_R}^{\alpha} & (\alpha - 1) * z_{-i}(+1) * z_{-1}(+1) \\ & = \\ & \text{wage_exp_R} \\ & + \text{eta} * (n_{_R} - n_{_R}(-1)) \\ & - (1 - \text{prob}) * \text{eta} * (n_{_R}(+1) - n_{_R}) \\ & - \text{prob} * \text{eta} * (\text{???} - n_{_R}) \end{aligned}$$

How to do it correctly with Dynare?

Suppose ??? in the previous slide is an *endogenous* rule that I have to solve for.

Can I solve for the policy rule of ??? and n_R with Dynare?

How to do it correctly with Dynare?

Can I do this with *first-order* perturbation?

Switching types and valuation problems

example above:

- rational firm does think through implications of choices for his irrational self
- But there is no "valuation" problem to assess value of irrational self
- Would that be problematic?

Switching types and valuation problems

new example

- simpler environment
- different question, namely:
 - calculate firm value
 - while rationally taking into account that you could become irrational
 - fixed probability of switching

Firm problem

$$zn_{-1}^\alpha - wn_{-1} + 0.5\eta(n - n_{-1})^2$$

$$v(n_{-1}, z) = \max_n \left[(1 - \rho) v(n, z_{+1}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\begin{array}{c} \rho w(n, z_{+1}) \end{array} \right] \right]$$

$$zn_{-1}^\alpha - wn_{-1} + 0.5\eta(n^* - n_{-1})^2$$

$$= \left[(1 - \rho) v(n^*, z_{+1}) + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[\begin{array}{c} \rho w(n^*, z_{+1}) \end{array} \right] \right]$$

Switching types and valuation problems

- $v(n_{-1}, z)$: value of a rational firm according to rational agent
- $w(n_{-1}, z)$: value of a irrational firm according to a rational agent, i.e. *using rational expectations*

Rational value of irrational firm

$$zn_{-1}^\alpha - wn_{-1} + 0.5\eta(\hat{n} - n_{-1})^2$$

$$w(n_{-1}, z) = +\beta E_t \left[\begin{array}{l} (1 - \rho) v(\hat{n}, z_{+1}) \\ \rho w(\hat{n}, z_{+1}) \end{array} \right]$$

So again a standard problem

Idiosyncratic shocks

- Do I need them?

Learning problem

- Go back to original problem
 - but no idiosyncratic shocks
- Type A firms forecast using "least-squares" learning
- They use past observations to fit forecasting rule for
- $\hat{E}[z_1], \hat{E}[z_2], \hat{E}[w_{+1}], \hat{E}[\hat{n}_{+1}]$

Forecasting rules

Example of forecasting rules

$$\hat{E}[y] = \hat{\omega}_0 + \hat{\omega}_1 y_{-1}$$

and $\hat{\omega}_0$ and $\hat{\omega}_1$ estimated using past observations

Weighted least-squares

$$y_t = b x_t + u_t$$

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{b}_T &= \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{T-t} x_t y_t}{\sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{T-t} x_t^2} \\ &= \frac{\sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{T-t} x_t y_t}{K_T}\end{aligned}$$

Recursive weighted least-squares

- For the problem to be tractable we need recursive formulation for the forecasts made by type A firms
 - like in the Kalman filter

Recursive weighted least-squares

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{b}_{T+1} &= \frac{\sum_{t=1}^{T+1} \beta^{T+1-t} x_t y_t}{K_{T+1}} \\ &= \frac{\beta \sum_{t=1}^T \beta^{T-t} x_t y_t + x_{T+1} y_{T+1}}{K_{T+1}} \\ &= \frac{\beta K_T}{K_{T+1}} \hat{b}_T + \frac{x_{T+1} y_{T+1}}{K_{T+1}} \\ K_{T+1} &= \beta K_T + x_{T+1}^2\end{aligned}$$

FOCs rational firm

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$$\begin{aligned} \alpha\beta\mathbb{E}[z_{i,+1}]\mathbb{E}[z_{2,+1}]n_2^{\alpha-1} - \beta\mathbb{E}[w_{+1}] \\ -\eta(n - n_{-1}) + \eta\beta\mathbb{E}[n_{+1} - n] = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Algorithm

- Parameterize expectations
 - which one(s)?
- Simulate economy
- Update expectation

State variables for rational agent

???

Tough problem?

- This is a standard problem
- Many state variables?
 - possibly if type A agents forecast a lot of variables
 - but maybe you don't need all as state variables to get an accurate solution

References

- Branch, W.A., and B.McGough, 2009, A New Keynesian Model with Heterogeneous Expectations, *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control*.
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- Nunes, R., 2009, Learning the inflation target, *Macroeconomic Dynamics*.