

Learning in Macroeconomic Models

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Overview

- A bit of history of economic thought
- How expectations are formed can matter *in the long run*
 - Seignorage model
- Learning without feedback
- Learning with feedback
 - Adaptive learning
 - Least-squares learning
 - Bayesian versus least-squares learning
 - Decision theoretic foundation of Adam & Marcet

Overview continued

Topics

- Learning & PEA
- Learning & sun spots

Why are expectations important?

- Most economic problems have intertemporal consequences
 - \implies future matters
- Moreover, future is uncertain
- Characteristics/behavior other agents can also be uncertain
 - \implies expectations can also matter in one-period problems

History of economic thought

- adaptive expectations:

$$\hat{E}_t [x_{t+1}] = \hat{E}_{t-1} [x_t] + \omega (x_t - \hat{E}_{t-1} [x_t])$$

- very popular until the 70s

History of economic thought

problematic features of adaptive expectations:

- agents can be systematically wrong
- agents are completely passive:
 - $\hat{E}_t [x_{t+j}] , j \geq 1$ only changes (at best) when x_t changes
 - \implies Pigou cycles are not possible
 - \implies model predictions *underestimate* speed of adjustment (e.g. for disinflation policies)

History of economic thought

problematic features of adaptive expectations:

- adaptive expectations about $x_{t+1} \neq$ adaptive expectations about Δx_{t+1}
 - (e.g. price level versus inflation)
- why wouldn't (some) agents use existing models to form expectations?
- expectations matter but still no role for randomness (of future realizations)
 - so no reason for buffer stock savings
 - no role for (model) uncertainty either

History of economic thought

rational expectations became popular because:

- agents are no longer passive machines, but forward looking
 - i.e., agents *think* through what could be consequences of their own actions and those of others (in particular government)
- consistency between model predictions and of agents being described
- randomness of future events become important
 - e.g., $E_t [c_{t+1}^{-\gamma}] \neq (E_t [c_{t+1}])^{-\gamma}$

History of economic thought

problematic features of rational expectations

- agents have to know *complete* model
 - make correct predictions about all possible realizations
 - on *and* off the equilibrium path
- costs of forming expectations are ignored
- how agents get rational expectations is not explained

History of economic thought

problematic features of rational expectations

- makes analysis more complex
 - behavior this period depends on behavior tomorrow for all possible realizations
 - \implies we have to solve for policy *functions*, not just simulate the economy

Expectations matter

- Simple example to show that how expectations are formed can matter in the long run
 - See Adam, Evans, & Honkapohja (2006) for a more elaborate analysis

Model

- Overlapping generations
- Agents live for 2 periods
- Agents save by holding money
- No random shocks

Model

$$\max_{c_{1,t}, c_{2,t}} \ln c_{1,t} + \ln c_{2,t}$$

s.t.

$$c_{2,t} \leq 1 + \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}^e} (2 - c_{1,t})$$

no randomness \implies we can work with expected value of variables instead of expected utility

Agent's behavior

First-order condition:

$$\frac{1}{c_{1,t}} = \frac{P_t}{P_{t+1}^e} \frac{1}{c_{2,t}} = \frac{1}{\pi_{t+1}^e} \frac{1}{c_{2,t}}$$

Solution for consumption:

$$c_{1,t} = 1 + \pi_{t+1}^e / 2$$

Solution for real money balance (=savings):

$$m_t = 2 - c_{1,t} = 1 - \pi_{t+1}^e / 2$$

Money supply

$$\overline{M}_t^s = \overline{M}$$

Equilibrium

Equilibrium in period t implies

$$\bar{M} = M_t$$

$$\bar{M} = P_t (1 - \pi_{t+1}^e / 2)$$

$$P_t = \frac{\bar{M}}{1 - \pi_{t+1}^e / 2}$$

Equilibrium

Combining with equilibrium in period $t - 1$ gives

$$\pi_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = \frac{1 - \pi_t^e/2}{1 - \pi_{t+1}^e/2}$$

Thus: π_t^e & $\pi_{t+1}^e \implies$ money demand \implies actual inflation π_t

Rational expectations solution

Optimizing behavior & equilibrium:

$$\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = T(\pi_t^e, \pi_{t+1}^e)$$

Rational expectations equilibrium (REE):

$$\pi_t = \pi_t^e$$

$$\implies$$

$$\pi_t = T(\pi_t, \pi_{t+1})$$

$$\implies$$

$$\pi_{t+1} = 3 - \frac{2}{\pi_t}$$

$$\pi_{t+1} = R(\pi_t)$$

Multiple steady states


- There are two solutions to

$$\pi = 3 - \frac{2}{\pi}$$

⇒ there are two steady states

- $\pi = 1$ (no inflation) and perfect consumption smoothing
 - $\pi = 2$ (high inflation) and no consumption smoothing at all
-
- Initial value for π_t not given, but given an initial condition the time path is fully determined

Rational expectations and stability



Rational expectations and stability

π_1 : value in period 1

$\pi_1 < 1$: divergence

$\pi_1 = 1$: economy stays at low-inflation steady state

$\pi_1 > 1$: convergence to high-inflation steady state


Alternative expectations

- Suppose that

$$\pi_{t+1}^e = \frac{1}{2}\pi_{t-1} + \frac{1}{2}\pi_t^e$$

- still the same two steady states, but
 - $\pi = 1$ is stable
 - $\pi = 2$ is not stable

Adaptive expectations and stability



Learning without feedback

Setup:

- 1 Agents know the complete model, except they do **not** know *dgp* exogenous processes
- 2 Agents use observations to update beliefs
- 3 Exogenous processes do not depend on beliefs
⇒ no feedback from learning to behavior of variable being forecasted

Learning without feedback & convergence

- If agents can learn the *dgp* of the exogenous processes, then you typically converge to REE
- They may not learn the correct *dgp* if
 - Agents use limited amount of data
 - Agents use misspecified time series process

Learning without feedback - Example

- Consider the following asset pricing model

$$P_t = E_t [\beta (P_{t+1} + D_{t+1})]$$

- If

$$\lim_{j \rightarrow \infty} \beta^{t+j} D_{t+j} = 0$$

then

$$P_t = E_t \left[\sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \beta^j D_{t+j} \right]$$

Learning without feedback - Example

- Suppose that

$$D_t = \rho D_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t, \varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2) \quad (1)$$

- REE:

$$P_t = \frac{D_t}{1 - \beta\rho}$$

(note that P_t could be negative so P_t is like a deviation from steady state level)

Learning without feedback - Example

- Suppose that agents do not know value of ρ
- Approach here:
 - If period t belief = $\hat{\rho}_t$, then

$$P_t = \frac{D_t}{1 - \beta \hat{\rho}_t}$$

- Agents ignore that their beliefs may change,
 - i.e., $\hat{E}_t [P_{t+j}] = E_t \left[\frac{D_{t+j}}{1 - \beta \hat{\rho}_{t+j}} \right]$ is assumed to equal $\frac{1}{1 - \beta \hat{\rho}_t} E_t [D_{t+j}]$

Learning without feedback - Example

How to learn about ρ ?

- Least squares learning using $\{D_t\}_{t=1}^T$ & correct dgp
- Least squares learning using $\{D_t\}_{t=1}^T$ & incorrect dgp
- Least squares learning using $\{D_t\}_{t=T-\bar{T}}^T$ & correct dgp
- Least squares learning using $\{D_t\}_{t=T-\bar{T}}^T$ & incorrect dgp
- Bayesian updating (also called rational learning)
- Lots of other possibilities

Convergence again

- Suppose that the true dgp is given by

$$\begin{aligned}D_t &= \rho_t D_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \\ \rho_t &\in \left\{ \rho_{\text{low}}, \rho_{\text{high}} \right\} \\ \rho_{t+1} &= \begin{cases} \rho_{\text{high}} & \text{w.p. } p(\rho_t) \\ \rho_{\text{low}} & \text{w.p. } 1 - p(\rho_t) \end{cases}\end{aligned}$$

- Suppose that agents think the true dgp is given by

$$D_t = \rho D_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

- \implies Agents will never learn
(see homework for importance of sample used to estimate ρ)

Recursive least-squares

- time-series model:

$$y_t = x_t' \gamma + u_t$$

- least-squares estimator

$$\hat{\gamma}_T = R_T^{-1} X_T' Y_T$$

where

$$X_T' = \begin{bmatrix} x_1 & x_2 & \cdots & x_T \end{bmatrix}$$

$$Y_T' = \begin{bmatrix} y_1 & y_2 & \cdots & y_T \end{bmatrix}$$

$$R_T = X_T' X_T$$

Recursive least-squares

$$R_T = R_{T-1} + \frac{(x_T x_T' - R_{T-1})}{T}$$

$$\hat{\gamma}_T = \hat{\gamma}_{T-1} + \frac{R_T^{-1} x_T (y_T - x_T' \hat{\gamma}_{T-1})}{T}$$

Proof for R

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{X'_T X_T}{T} & \stackrel{?}{=} \frac{X'_{T-1} X_{T-1}}{(T-1)} + \frac{x_T x'_T}{T} - \frac{X'_{T-1} X_{T-1}}{T(T-1)} \\
 \left(\frac{T-1}{T}\right) X'_T X_T & \stackrel{?}{=} X'_{T-1} X_{T-1} + \frac{T-1}{T} x_T x'_T - \frac{X'_{T-1} X_{T-1}}{T} \\
 X'_T X_T - \frac{X'_T X_T}{T} & \stackrel{?}{=} X'_{T-1} X_{T-1} + x_T x'_T - \frac{x_T x'_T}{T} - \frac{X'_{T-1} X_{T-1}}{T} \\
 X'_{T-1} X_{T-1} + x_T x'_T & \stackrel{?}{=} X'_{T-1} X_{T-1} + x_T x'_T \\
 - \frac{X'_{T-1} X_{T-1} + x_T x'_T}{T} & \stackrel{?}{=} - \frac{x_T x'_T + X'_{T-1} X_{T-1}}{T}
 \end{aligned}$$

Proof for gamma

$$\begin{aligned}
 (X'_T X_T)^{-1} & \stackrel{?}{=} (X'_{T-1} X_{T-1})^{-1} X'_{T-1} Y_{T-1} + \\
 \times X'_T Y_T & \quad \left(\begin{array}{c} x_T y_T \\ -x_T x'_T (X'_{T-1} X_{T-1})^{-1} X'_{T-1} Y_{T-1} \end{array} \right) \\
 X'_T Y_T & \stackrel{?}{=} (X'_{T-1} X_{T-1} + x_T x'_T) (X'_{T-1} X_{T-1})^{-1} X'_{T-1} Y_{T-1} \\
 & \quad + \left(\begin{array}{c} x_T y_T \\ -x_T x'_T (X'_{T-1} X_{T-1})^{-1} X'_{T-1} Y_{T-1} \end{array} \right) \\
 X'_T Y_T & \stackrel{?}{=} \left(I + x_T x'_T (X'_{T-1} X_{T-1})^{-1} \right) X'_{T-1} Y_{T-1} \\
 & \quad + \left(\begin{array}{c} x_T y_T \\ -x_T x'_T (X'_{T-1} X_{T-1})^{-1} X'_{T-1} Y_{T-1} \end{array} \right)
 \end{aligned}$$

Reasons to adopt recursive formulation

- makes proving analytical results easier
- less computer intensive,
 - but standard LS gives the same answer
- there are intuitive generalizations:

$$R_T = R_{T-1} + \omega(T) (x_T x_T' - R_{T-1})$$

$$\hat{\gamma}_T = \hat{\gamma}_{T-1} + \omega(T) R_T^{-1} x_T (y_T - x_T' \hat{\gamma}_{T-1})$$

$\omega(T)$ is the "gain"

Learning with feedback

- 1 Explanation of the idea
- 2 Adaptive learning
 - E-stability and convergence
- 3 Least-squares learning
 - E-stability and convergence
- 4 Bayesian versus least-squares learning
- 5 Decision theoretic foundation of Adam & Marcet

Learning with feedback - basic setup

Model:

$$p_t = \rho \hat{E}_{t-1} [p_t] + \delta x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

RE solution:

$$\begin{aligned} p_t &= \frac{\delta}{1 - \rho} x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \\ &= a_{\text{re}} x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t \end{aligned}$$

What is behind model

Model:

$$p_t = \rho \hat{E}_{t-1} [p_t] + \delta x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

Stories:

- Lucas aggregate supply model
- Muth market model

See Evans and Honkapohja (2009) for details

Learning with feedback - basic setup

Perceived law of motion (PLM) at $t - 1$:

$$p_t = \hat{a}_{t-1}x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

Actual law of motion (ALM):

$$p_t = \rho\hat{a}_{t-1}x_{t-1} + \delta x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t = (\rho\hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta)x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

Updating beliefs I: Adaptive

$$\text{ALM: } p_t = (\rho \hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta) x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

Adaptive learning:

- $\hat{a}_t = \rho \hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta$
- could be rationalized if
 - agents observe x_{t-1} and ε_t
 - t is more like an iteration and in each iteration agents get (long) time-series to update

Adaptive learning: Convergence

$$\hat{a}_t = \rho \hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta$$

or in general

$$\hat{a}_t - \hat{a}_{t-1} = T(\hat{a}_{t-1})$$

Key questions:

- 1 Does \hat{a}_t converge?
- 2 If yes, does it converge to a_{RE}

Adaptive learning: E-stability

$$\hat{a}_t - \hat{a}_{t-1} = T(\hat{a}_{t-1})$$

Limiting behavior can be analyzed using

$$\frac{da}{d\tau} = T(a(\tau))$$

A solution a^* (e.g. a_{RE}) is *E-stable* if $T(a)$ is stable at a^*

E-stability

- $T(a)$ is stable if real part of the eigenvalues is negative:
 - $da > 0$ if $a < 0$
 - $da < 0$ if $a > 0$

- Here:

$$T(a) = (\rho - 1) a + \delta$$

\implies convergence if $\rho - 1 < 0$

Adaptive learning: weakness

$$\text{ALM: } p_t = (\rho \hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta) x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

- Agents (typically) do not observe $(\rho \hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta)$
- \implies so not too convincing to set $\hat{a}_t = \rho \hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta$

Updating beliefs: LS learning

Suppose agents use least-squares learning

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{a}_t &= \hat{a}_{t-1} + \frac{R_t^{-1} x_{t-1} (p_t - x_{t-1} \hat{a}_{t-1})}{t} \\ &= \hat{a}_{t-1} + \frac{R_t^{-1} x_{t-1} ((\rho \hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta) x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t - x_{t-1} \hat{a}_{t-1})}{t} \\ R_t &= R_{t-1} + \frac{(x_{t-1} x_{t-1}' - R_{t-1})}{t}\end{aligned}$$

Updating beliefs: LS learning

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{a}_t &= \hat{a}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} R_t^{-1} x_{t-1} (p_t - x_{t-1} \hat{a}_{t-1}) \\ &= \hat{a}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} R_t^{-1} x_{t-1} ((\rho \hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta) x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t - x_{t-1} \hat{a}_{t-1}) \\ R_t &= R_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} (x_{t-1} x_{t-1} - R_{t-1})\end{aligned}$$

To get system with only lags on RHS, let $R_t = S_{t-1}$

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{a}_t &= \hat{a}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} S_{t-1}^{-1} x_{t-1} ((\rho \hat{a}_{t-1} + \delta) x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t - x_{t-1} \hat{a}_{t-1}) \\ S_t &= S_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} (x_t x_t - S_{t-1}) \frac{t}{t+1}\end{aligned}$$

Updating beliefs: LS learning

This can be written as

$$\hat{\theta}_t = \hat{\theta}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} Q(\hat{\theta}_{t-1}, x_t, x_{t-1}, \varepsilon_t) = T(\hat{\theta}_{t-1}, x_t, x_{t-1}, \varepsilon_t, t)$$

Key question

- If

$$\hat{\theta}_t = T(\hat{\theta}_{t-1}, x_t, x_{t-1}, \varepsilon_t, t)$$

then what can we "expect": about $\hat{\theta}_t$?

- In particular, can we "expect" that

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \hat{a}_t = a_{re}$$

Corresponding differential equation

Much can be learned from following differential equation

$$\frac{d\theta}{d\tau} = h(\theta(\tau))$$

where

$$h(\theta) = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \left[Q(\hat{\theta}_{t-1}, x_t, x_{t-1}, \varepsilon_t) \right]$$

Corresponding differential equation

In our example

$$\begin{aligned}h(\theta) &= \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} [Q(\theta, x_t, x_{t-1}, \varepsilon_t)] \\&= \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} \left[\frac{S^{-1} x_{t-1} ((\rho a + \delta) x_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t - x_{t-1} a)}{(x_t x_t - S) \frac{t}{t+1}} \right] \\&= \left[\begin{array}{c} MS^{-1} ((\rho - 1) a + \delta) \\ M - S \end{array} \right]\end{aligned}$$

where

$$M = \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E} [x_t^2]$$

Analyze the differential equation

$$\frac{d\theta}{d\tau} = \begin{bmatrix} MS^{-1} ((\rho - 1) a + \delta) \\ M - S \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\frac{d\theta}{d\tau} = 0 \text{ if } M = S \text{ \& } a = \frac{\delta}{1 - \rho}$$

Thus, the (unique) rest point of $h(\theta)$ is the rational expectations solution

Implications of E-stability?

- Adaptive learning: no stochastics in $T(\cdot)$ mapping
- Recursive least-squares: stochastics in $T(\cdot)$ mapping
 - \implies what will happen is less certain, even if with E-stability

Implications of E-stability?

- If a solution **is not** E-stable:
 - \implies non-convergence is a probability 1 event
- If a solution **is** E-stable:
 - the presence of stochastics make the theorems non-trivial
 - we only have info about *mean dynamics*

Mean dynamics

See Evans and Honkapohja textbook for formal results.

- Theorems are a bit tricky, but are of the following kind:
If a solution f^ is E-stable, then the time path under learning will either leave the neighborhood in finite time or will converge towards f^* . Moreover, the longer it does not leave this neighborhood, the smaller the probability that it will*
- So there are two parts
 - mean dynamics: convergence towards fixed point
 - escape dynamics: (large) shocks may push you away from fixed point

Importance of Gain

$$\hat{\gamma}_T = \hat{\gamma}_{T-1} + \omega(T)R_T^{-1}x_T (y_T - x_T'\hat{\gamma}_{T-1})$$

- Gain in least squares updating formula, $\omega(T)$, plays a key role in theorems
- $\omega(T) \rightarrow 0$ too fast: you may end up in something that is not an equilibrium
- $\omega(T) \rightarrow 0$ too slowly: you may not converge towards it
- So depending on the application, you may need conditions like

$$\sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \omega(t)^2 < \infty \text{ and } \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \omega(t) = \infty$$

Bayesian learning

- LS learning has some disadvantages:
 - why "least-squares" and not something else?
 - how to choose gain?
 - why don't agents incorporate that beliefs change?
- Beliefs are updated each period
 - ⇒ Bayesian learning is an obvious thing to consider

Bayesian versus LS learning

- LS learning \neq Bayesian learning with uninformed prior at least not always
- Bullard and Suda (2009) provide following nice example

Bayesian versus LS learning

Model:

$$p_t = \rho_L p_{t-1} + \rho_0 \hat{E}_{t-1} [p_t] + \rho_1 \hat{E}_{t-1} [p_{t+1}] + \varepsilon_t \quad (2)$$

- Key difference with earlier model:
 - two extra terms

Bayesian versus LS learning

Solution:

-

$$p_t = bp_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

where a is a solution to

$$b = \rho_L + \rho_0 b + \rho_1 b^2$$

Bayesian learning - setup

- PLM:

$$p_t = \hat{b}_{t-1} p_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t$$

and ε_t has a known distribution

- plug PLM into (2) \implies ALM
 - but a Bayesian learner is a bit more careful

Bayesian learner understands he is learning

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{E}_{t-1} [p_{t+1}] &= \hat{E}_{t-1} [\rho_L p_t + \rho_0 \hat{E}_t [p_{t+1}] + \rho_1 \hat{E}_t [p_{t+2}]] \\ &= \rho_L \hat{b}_{t-1} p_{t-1} + \hat{E}_{t-1} [\rho_0 \hat{E}_t [p_{t+1}] + \rho_1 \hat{E}_t [p_{t+2}]] \\ &= \rho_L \hat{b}_{t-1} p_{t-1} + \hat{E}_{t-1} [\rho_0 \hat{b}_t p_t + \rho_1 \hat{b}_t p_{t+1}]\end{aligned}$$

- \hat{b}_t and p_{t+1} are both affected by ε_{t+1} !

Bayesian learner understands he is learning

- Bayesian learner realizes that

$$\hat{E}_{t-1} [\hat{b}_t p_{t+1}] \neq \hat{E}_{t-1} [p_{t+1}] \hat{E}_{t-1} [p_{t+1}]$$

and calculates $\hat{E}_{t-1} [\hat{b}_t p_{t+1}]$ explicitly

- LS learner forms expectations thinking that

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{E}_{t-1} [\hat{b}_t p_{t+1}] &= \hat{E}_{t-1} [\hat{b}_{t-1} p_{t+1}] \\ &= \hat{b}_{t-1} \hat{E}_{t-1} \left[\left(\rho_L p + \rho_0 \hat{b}_{t-1} + \rho_1 \hat{b}_{t-1} \right) p_t \right] \end{aligned}$$

Bayesian versus LS learning

- Bayesian learner cares about a covariance term
- Bullard and Suda (2009) show that Bayesian is similar to LS learning in terms of E-stability
- Such covariance terms more important in nonlinear frameworks
- Unfortunately not much done with nonlinear models

Learning what?

Model:

$$P_t = \beta E_t [P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}]$$

- Learning can be incorporated in many ways.
- Obvious choices here:
 - ❶ learn about *dgp* D_t and use true mapping for $P_t = P(D_t)$
 - ❷ know *dgp* D_t and learn about $P_t = P(D_t)$
 - ❸ learn about both

Learning what?

- ① Adam, Marcet, Nicolini (2009): one can solve several asset pricing puzzles using a simple model if learning is learning about $E_t [P_{t+1}]$ (instead of learning about *dgp* D_t)
- ② Adam and Marcet (2011): provide micro foundations that this is a sensible choice

Simple model

Model:

$$P_t = \beta \mathbf{E}_t [P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}]$$

$$\frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t} = a \varepsilon_{t+1}$$

with

$$\mathbf{E}_t [\varepsilon_{t+1}] = 0$$

ε_t i.i.d.

Model properties REE

- Solution:

$$P_t = \frac{\beta a}{1 - \beta a} D_t$$

- P_t/D_t is constant
- P_t/P_{t-1} is i.i.d.

Adam, Marcet, & Nicolini 2009

PLM:

$$\hat{\mathbb{E}}_t \left[\frac{P_{t+1}}{P_t} \right] = \gamma_t$$

ALM:

$$\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = \frac{1 - \beta\gamma_{t-1}}{1 - \beta\gamma_t} a \varepsilon_t = \left(a + \frac{a\beta\Delta\gamma_t}{1 - \beta\gamma_t} \right) \varepsilon_t$$
$$\gamma_{t+1} = \left(a + \frac{a\beta\Delta\gamma_t}{1 - \beta\gamma_t} \right)$$

Model properties with learning

- Solution is quite nonlinear
 - especially if γ_t is close to β^{-1}
- Serial correlation.
 - in fact there is momentum. For example:

$$\gamma_t = a \ \& \ \Delta\gamma_t > 0 \implies \Delta\gamma_{t+1} > 0$$

$$\gamma_t = a \ \& \ \Delta\gamma_t < 0 \implies \Delta\gamma_{t+1} < 0$$

- P_t/D_t is time varying

Adam, Marcet, & Nicolini 2011

Agent i does following optimization problem

$$\max \widehat{E}_{i,t} [\cdot]$$

- $\widehat{E}_{i,t}$ is based on a sensible probability measure
- $\widehat{E}_{i,t}$ is not necessarily the true conditional expectation

Adam, Marcet, & Nicolini 2011

- Setup leads to standard first-order conditions but with $\widehat{E}_{i,t}$ instead of E_t
- For example

$$P_t = \beta \widehat{E}_{i,t} [P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}]$$

if agent i is not constrained

- Key idea:
 - price determination is difficult
 - agents do not know this mapping
 - \implies they forecast $\widehat{E}_{i,t} [P_{t+1}]$ directly
 - \implies law of iterated expectations cannot be used because next period agent i may be constrained in which case the equality does not hold

Topics - Overview

- ① E-stability and sun spots
- ② Learning and nonlinearities
Parameterized expectations
- ③ Two representations of sun spots

E-stability and sunspots

Model:

$$x_t = \rho E_t [x_{t+1}]$$

x_t cannot explode

no initial condition

Solution:

$$|\rho| < 1 : x_t = 0 \quad \forall t$$

$$|\rho| \geq 1 : x_t = \rho^{-1} x_{t-1} + e_t \quad \forall t$$

where e_t is the sun spot (which has $E_t [e_t] = 0$)

Adaptive learning

PLM:

$$x_t = \hat{a}_t x_{t-1} + e_t$$

ALM:

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= \hat{a}_t \rho x_{t-1} \\ \implies \hat{a}_{t+1} &= \hat{a}_t \rho \end{aligned}$$

- thus divergence when $|\rho| > 1$ (sun spot solutions)

Adaptive learning

PLM:

$$x_t = \hat{a}_t x_{t-1} + e_t$$

ALM:

$$\begin{aligned} x_t &= \hat{a}_t \rho x_{t-1} \\ \implies \hat{a}_{t+1} &= \hat{a}_t \rho \end{aligned}$$

- thus divergence when $|\rho| > 1$ (sun spot solutions)

Stability puzzle

- There are few counter examples and not too clear why sun spots are not learnable in RBC-type models
 - Sun spot solutions are learnable in some New Keynesian models (Evans and McGough 2005)
 - McGough, Meng, and Xue 2011 provide a counterexample and show that an RBC model with *negative* externalities has learnable sun spot solutions

PEA and learning

- Learning is usually done in linear frameworks
- PEA parameterized the conditional expectations in nonlinear frameworks
- \implies PEA is a natural setting to do both
 - adaptive learning
 - recursive learning

Model

$$P_t = \mathbb{E} \left[\beta \left(\frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t} \right)^{-\nu} (P_{t+1} + D_{t+1}) \right] = G(X_t)$$

X_t : state variables

Conventional PEA in a nutshell

- Start with a guess for $G(X_t)$, say $g(x_t; \eta_0)$
 - $g(\cdot)$ may have wrong functional form
 - x_t may only be a subset of X_t
 - η_0 are the coefficients of $g(\cdot)$

Conventional PEA in a nutshell

- Iterate to find fixed point for η_i
 - ① use η_i to generate time path $\{P_t\}_{t=1}^T$

② let

$$\hat{\eta}_i = \arg \min_{\eta} \sum_t (y_{t+1} - g(x_t; \eta))^2$$

where

$$y_{t+1} = \beta \left(\frac{D_{t+1}}{D_t} \right)^{-v} (P_{t+1} + D_{t+1})$$

③ Dampen if necessary

$$\eta_{i+1} = \omega \hat{\eta}_i + (1 - \omega) \eta_i$$

Interpretation of conventional PEA

- Agents have beliefs
- Agents get to observe long sample generated with these beliefs
- Agents update beliefs
- Corresponds to adaptive expectations
 - no stochastics if T is large enough

Recursive PEA

- Agents form expectations using $g(x_t; \eta_t)$
- Solve for P_t using

$$P_t = g(x_t; \eta_t)$$

- Update beliefs using this one additional observation
- Go to the next period using η_{t+1}

Recursive methods and convergence

Look at recursive formulation of LS:

$$\hat{\gamma}_t = \hat{\gamma}_{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} R_t^{-1} x_t (y_t - x_t' \hat{\gamma}_{t-1})$$

- !!! $\Delta \hat{\gamma}_t$ gets smaller as t gets bigger

General form versus common factor representation

Sun spot literature distinguishes between:

- ➊ General form representation of a sun spot
- ➋ Common factor representation of a sun spot

First consider non-sun-spot indeterminacy

Model:

$$k_{t+1} + a_1 k_t + a_2 k_{t-1} = 0 \text{ or}$$

$$(1 - \lambda_1 L)(1 - \lambda_2 L) k_{t+1} = 0$$

Also:

- k_0 given
- k_t has to remain finite

Multiplicity

Model:

$$k_{t+1} + a_1 k_t + a_2 k_{t-1} = 0 \text{ or}$$

$$(1 - \lambda_1 L)(1 - \lambda_2 L) k_{t+1} = 0$$

Also:

- k_0 given
- k_t has to remain finite

Multiplicity

Solution:

$$\begin{aligned}k_t &= b_1 \lambda_1^t + b_2 \lambda_2^t \\ k_0 &= b_1 + b_2\end{aligned}$$

Thus many possible choices for b_1 and b_2 if $|\lambda_1| < 1$ and $|\lambda_2| < 1$

Multiplicity

- What if we impose recursivity?

$$k_t = \bar{d}k_{t-1}$$

- Does that get rid of multiplicity? No, but it does reduce the number of solutions from ∞ to 2

$$\begin{aligned} (\bar{d}^2 + a_1\bar{d} + a_2) k_{t-1} &= 0 \quad \forall t \\ &\implies \\ (\bar{d}^2 + a_1\bar{d} + a_2) &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

the two solutions correspond to setting either λ_1 or λ_2 equal to 0

Back to sun spots

Doing the same trick with sun spots gives a solution with following two properties:

- ① it has a *serially correlated* sun spot component with the same factor as the endogenous variable (i.e. the common factor)
- ② there are two of these

General form representation

Model:

$$\begin{aligned} E_t [k_{t+1} + a_1 k_t + a_2 k_{t-1}] &= 0 \text{ or} \\ (1 - \lambda_1 L) (1 - \lambda_2 L) k_{t+1} &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

General form representation:

$$\begin{aligned} k_t &= b_1 \lambda_1^t + b_2 \lambda_2^t + e_t \\ k_0 &= b_1 + b_2 + e_0 \end{aligned}$$

where e_t is serially uncorrelated

Common factor representation

Model:

$$\begin{aligned} E_t [k_{t+1} + a_1 k_t + a_2 k_{t-1}] &= 0 \text{ or} \\ (1 - \lambda_1 L) (1 - \lambda_2 L) k_{t+1} &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

Common factor representation:

$$\begin{aligned} k_t &= b_1 \lambda_i^t + \zeta_t \\ \zeta_t &= \lambda_i \zeta_{t-1} + e_t \\ k_0 &= b_i + \zeta_0 \\ \lambda_i &\in \{\lambda_1, \lambda_2\} \end{aligned}$$

where e_t is serially uncorrelated

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