(Updated 13/7/2004)
Leonardo Felli LSE


Leonardo Felli

Published Papers

  • L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (2001): "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation," Econometrica, 69, 377-411. Abstract and paper.

  • L. Felli and J. Miguel Villas-Boas, (2000): "Renegotiation and Collusion in Organizations," Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9, 453-483.Abstract and paper.

  • L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (1999): "Incomplete Contracts and Complexity Costs," Theory and Decision, 46, 23-50. Abstract and paper.

  • L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (1998): "Describability and Agency Problems," European Economic Review, 42, 35-59. Abstract and paper.

  • F. Cornelli and L. Felli, (1997): "Ex-ante Efficiency of Bankruptcy Procedures," European Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 41, 475-485. Abstract and paper.

  • L. Felli and C. Harris, (1996): "Learning, Wage Dynamics and Firm-Specific Human Capital," Journal of Political Economy, 104, 838-868. Abstract and paper.

  • L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (1994): "Incomplete Written Contracts: Undescribable States of Nature," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1085-1124. Abstract and paper.

  • L. Felli, (1993): "Turnovers and Asymptotic Behavior of Workers", Economic Letters, 42, 43-50. Abstract and paper.

  • L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (2004): "Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts," Research in Economics, 58, 3-30. Abstract and paper.

  • L. Felli and C. Harris, (1996): "A Note on G. Bertola and L. Felli (1993)," Research in Economics, 50, 317-319. Abstract and paper.

  • G. Bertola and L. Felli, (1993): "Job Matching and the Distribution of Producer Surplus," Research in Economics, 47, 65-92. Abstract.

    Other Publications

  • L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (2004): "Costly Contingent Contracts: A Failure of the Coase Theorem," in Legal Orderings and Economic Institutions , Fabrizio Cafaggi, Antonio Nicita and Ugo Pagano (eds.), London: Routledge. Book summary.

  • L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (2004): Book review of Economics and Language. Five Essays by Ariel Rubinstein, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 2000. Economica, 71, 169-171. Book review.

  • L. Felli and K. Roberts, (2000): "Competition and Hold-Ups," in Putting Economics to Work: Volume in Honour of Michio Morishima , Tony Atkinson, Howard Glennester and Nicholas Stern (eds.), London: STICERD. Book and paper.

  • F. Cornelli and L. Felli, (1995): "The Theory of Bankruptcy and Mechanism Design," in Crisis, What Crisis? Orderly Workouts for Sovereign Debtors, by B. Eichengreen and R. Portes, London: CEPR. Book summary.

    Working Papers

  • L. Felli and C. Harris, (2004): "Firm-Specific Training," STICERD Theoretical Economics discussion paper No. TE/04/473, London School of Economics. Abstract and paper. NEW, April 2004.

  • L. Anderlini, L. Felli and A. Postlewaite, (2003): "Should Courts Always Enforce What Contracting Parties Write?," STICERD Theoretical Economics discussion paper No. TE/03/464, London School of Economics. Abstract and paper. November 2003.

  • N. I. Al-Najjar, L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (2003): "Undescribable Events," Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics & Management Science Discussion Paper No. 1370, Northwestern University. Abstract and paper. Revised May 2004.

  • L. Anderlini, L. Felli and A. Postlewaite, (2001): "Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies," Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper 01-05, University of Pennsylvania. Abstract and paper. Revised March 2004.

  • L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (2001): "Transaction Costs and the Robustness of the Coase Theorem," STICERD Theoretical Economics discussion paper No. TE/01/409, London School of Economics. Abstract and paper. Revised February 2004.

  • F. Cornelli and L. Felli, (2001): "How to Sell a (Bankrupt) Company," CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2881, London. Abstract and paper. Revised April 2003.

  • L. Felli and K. Roberts, (2001): "Does Competition Solve the Hold-up Problem?" STICERD Theoretical Economics discussion paper No. TE/01/414, London School of Economics. Abstract and paper. Revised June 2002.

  • L. Felli and A. Merlo, (2000): "Endogenous Lobbying," STICERD Theoretical Economics discussion paper No. TE/03/448, London School of Economics. Abstract and paper. Revised July 2003.

  • L. Anderlini and L. Felli, (1998): "Costly Coasian Contracts," STICERD Theoretical Economics discussion paper No. TE/98/362, London School of Economics. Abstract and paper.

  • L. Felli and F. Ortalo-Magné, (1997): "Technological Innovations: Slumps and Booms," CARESS Working Paper No. 97-17, University of Pennsylvania. Abstract and paper.

  • L. Felli, (1996): "Preventing Collusion through Discretion", STICERD Theoretical Economics discussion paper No. TE/96/303, London School of Economics. Abstract.

  • P. Diamond and L. Felli, (1993): "Search, Sticky Prices and Deflation," London School of Economics, mimeo. Abstract.

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