

Heterogeneous Agents but no Aggregate Uncertainty

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May 4, 2010

- Subject to i.i.d. idiosyncratic productivity shocks $e_{i,t} \in \{0.9, 1.1\}$
- Incomplete markets
 - only way to save is through holding capital
 - investing small and large amounts "costlier" than intermediate amounts

Individual agent - standard formulation

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{\{c_{i,t}, k_{i,t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln(c_{i,t}) \\ & \text{s.t.} \\ & c_{i,t} + k_{i,t} = r_t k_{i,t-1} + w_t e_{i,t} + (1 - \delta) k_{i,t-1} \\ & k_{i,t} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Individual agent - alternative formulation I

$$\max_{\{c_{i,t}, k_{i,t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln(c_{i,t})$$

s.t.

$$c_{i,t} + k_{i,t} = r_{i,t}k_{i,t-1} + w_t e_{i,t} + (1 - \delta)k_{i,t-1}$$

$$r_{i,t} = r_t + \frac{\zeta_1}{\zeta_0} \exp(-\zeta_0 k_{i,t})$$

Individual agent - alternative formulation I

$$\max_{\{c_{i,t}, k_{i,t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln(c_{i,t})$$

s.t.

$$c_{i,t} + k_{i,t} = r_{i,t}k_{i,t-1} + w_t e_{i,t} + (1 - \delta)k_{i,t-1}$$

$$r_{i,t} = r_t + \frac{\zeta_1}{\zeta_0} \exp(-\zeta_0 k_{i,t})$$

Individual agent - alternative formulation II

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\{c_{i,t}, k_{i,t+1}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} & E \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \ln(c_{i,t}) - \frac{\zeta_1}{\zeta_0} \exp(-\zeta_0 k_{i,t}) \\ \text{s.t.} & \\ c_{i,t} + k_{i,t} &= r_t k_{i,t-1} + w_t e_{i,t} + (1 - \delta) k_{i,t-1} \end{aligned}$$

Individual agent - alternative formulation II

- Budget constraint same as original formulation
- Only Euler equation affected
- No non-differentiabilities
- Two ways to think of penalty function:
 - numerical procedure to mimic/implement inequality constraint
 - alternative economic story

Individual agent - Euler equation

$$-\frac{1}{c_{i,t}} + \zeta_1 \exp(-\zeta_0 k_{i,t}) + E_t \left[\frac{\beta}{c_{i,t+1}} (r_{t+1} + 1 - \delta) \right] = 0$$

- Unit mass of worker, $L_t = 1$
- Competitive firm so agent faces competitive prices
 - $w_t = (1 - \alpha) K_t^\alpha$
 - $r_t = \alpha K_t^{\alpha-1}$
- No aggregate risk so

$$K_t = K$$

- How to find the equilibrium K ?

Algorithm

- Guess a value for r
- This implies values for w and K (i.e., demand for capital)
- Solve the individual problem with this value for r (and w)
- Calculate supply of capital K^{supply}
 - e.g., by simulating
- If $K^{\text{supply}} < K$ then r too low so raise r , say

$$r^{\text{new}} = r + \lambda(K - K^{\text{supply}})$$

- Iterate until convergence

Calculating average K

- 1 First procedure:
 - 1 Start with a cross-section of many agents
 - 2 Simulate until cross-sectional average of capital has converged
- 2 Second (simpler) procedure:
 - 1 Simulate capital stock for one agent
 - 2 Take time-series average
 - disregard some initial observations to avoid dependence on weird initial value

Calculating average K without simulating

Consider the simple grid method to simulate

- $p_{e,t}$: vector with fraction of employed agent's at grid points for k
- $p_{u,t}$: vector with fraction of unemployed agent's at grid points for k

$$p_{t+1} = Ap_t$$

The ergodic distribution p is the normalized eigenvector corresponding to the unit eigenvalue of A

Calculating average K without simulating

$$p_{t+1} = Ap_t$$

Where does this come from?

$$p_{e,t+1} = \lambda_e \Omega_e p_{e,t} + (1 - \lambda_u) \Omega_u p_{u,t}$$

$$p_{u,t+1} = \lambda_u \Omega_u p_{u,t} + (1 - \lambda_e) \Omega_e p_{e,t}$$

$$p_{t+1} = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda_e \Omega_e & (1 - \lambda_u) \Omega_u \\ (1 - \lambda_e) \Omega_e & \lambda_u \Omega_u \end{bmatrix} p_t$$

Explicit aggregation - linear case

- Suppose individual policy rule is linear:

$$k_{i,t} = b_0 + b_1 k_{i,t-1} + b_2 (e_{i,t} - 1)$$

- Implied aggregate policy rule:

$$K_t = b_0 + b_1 K_{i,t-1}$$

- Thus, implied supply of capital:

$$K = b_0 / (1 - b_1)$$

Explicit aggregation - second order

- Suppose individual policy rule is quadratic:

$$k_{i,t} = b_0 + b_1 k_{i,t-1} + b_2 (e_{i,t} - 1) + b_3 k_{i,t-1}^2 + b_4 k_{i,t-1} (e_{i,t} - 1) + b_5 (e_{i,t} - 1)^2$$

- Implied aggregate policy rule:

$$K_t = b_0 + b_1 K_{t-1} + 0 + b_3 M_{t-1}(2) + 0 + b_5 \sigma_e^2$$

where

$$M_{t-1}(2)$$

is the cross-sectional mean of

$$k_{i,t-1}^2$$

- At the ergodic distribution:

$$\begin{aligned}K_t &= K_{t-1} = K \\M_t(2) &= M_{t-1}(2) = M(2)\end{aligned}$$



$$K = \frac{b_0 + b_3 M(2) + b_5 \sigma_e^2}{1 - b_1}$$

- How to calculate $M(2)$?

Explicit aggregation - how to calculate $M(2)$?

$$k_{i,t}^2 = \left(\begin{array}{l} b_0 + b_1 k_{i,t-1} + b_2 (e_{i,t} - 1) \\ + b_3 k_{i,t-1}^2 + b_4 k_{i,t-1} (e_{i,t} - 1) + b_5 (e_{i,t} - 1)^2 \end{array} \right)^2$$

- Explicitly aggregating RHS gives

$$M_{t-1}(3) \text{ and } M_{t-1}(4)$$

- Continuing like this will go on forever

Explicit aggregation - how to calculate $M(2)$?

- Instead of using

$$k_{i,t}^2 = \left(\begin{array}{l} b_0 + b_1 k_{i,t-1} + b_2 (e_{i,t} - 1) \\ + b_3 k_{i,t-1}^2 + b_4 k_{i,t-1} (e_{i,t} - 1) + b_5 (e_{i,t} - 1)^2 \end{array} \right)^2$$

use

$$k_{i,t}^2 = \left(\begin{array}{l} d_0 + d_1 k_{i,t-1} + d_2 (e_{i,t} - 1) \\ + d_3 k_{i,t-1}^2 + d_4 k_{i,t-1} (e_{i,t} - 1) + d_5 (e_{i,t} - 1)^2 \end{array} \right)$$

- Explicitly aggregating RHS gives

$$M(2)_t = \begin{array}{l} d_0 + d_1 K_{t-1} + 0 \\ + d_3 M_{t-1}(2) + 0 + d_5 \sigma_e^2 \end{array}$$

Explicit aggregation - how to calculate $M(2)$?

- At the ergodic distribution

$$K = \frac{b_0 + bK + 0}{+b_3M(2) + 0 + b_5\sigma_e^2}$$

$$M(2) = \frac{d_0 + d_1K + 0}{+d_3M(2) + 0 + d_5\sigma_e^2}$$

- That is, linear system in two unknowns

Explicit aggregation - higher order

- If you have n^{th} order solution for $k_{i,t}$ then it is very easy to get n^{th} order solution for $k_{i,t}^m$ for any m
- This is the fastest way to solve the model without aggregate uncertainty
 - !!! you don't have to simulate

Explicit aggregation - ???

- Explicit aggregation: calculate average K
 - without simulating and
 - without calculating a distribution
- How is this possible?