Research Interests:
Microeconomic theory, game theory, bounded rationality.

Selected Publications:
[1] "Finite Automata Equilibria with Discounting," Journal of Economic Theory, 1992, 180-193.
[2] "The Economics of Hubs: The Case of Monopoly," with K. Hendricks and G. Tan, Review of Economic Studies, 1995, 83-99.
[3] "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall," with A. Rubinstein, Games and Economic Behavior, July 1997, 3-24.
[4] "Equilibria in Networks," with K. Hendricks and G. Tan, Econometrica, 1999, 1407-1434.
[5] "Sequential Voting Procedures in Symmetric Binary Elections", with E. Dekel, Journal of Political Economy, 2000, 34-55.
[6] "The Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring", Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 70-83.
[7] "Equilibrium in the Jungle", with A. Rubinstein, Economic Journal, 2007, 883-896.
[8] "Coalition Formation under Power Relations", with Ronny Razin, Theoretical Economics, 2009, 1-15.
[9] "Price Competition under Limited Comparability", with Rani Spiegler, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012, 97-135.
[10] "An Approach to Asset-Pricing Under Incomplete and Diverse Perceptions", with Erik Eyster, Econometrica, 2013, 1483-1506.
[11] "Efficiency in Repeated Games with Local Interaction and Uncertain Local Monitoring", with Francesco Nava, Theoretical Economics, 2014, 279-312.
[12] "The Strategic Dis/advantage of Voting Early", with Eddie Dekel, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2014, 162-179.
[13] "Correlation Misperception in Choice", with Andrew Ellis, forthcoming, American Economic Review, 2016.